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The end of the Cold War has resulted m a general tendency towards 
democratization all over the world. The United States and other Western countries such as 
France and Britain are determined to help African countries establish democratic 
institutions and improve good governance. The reluctance and instability of many African 
societies and regimes to democratize inspired the research questions of this thesis: Why is 
Africa so vulnerable to military coups? Why is political and economic modernization so 
difficult in Africa? What is wrong with Africa? Can Africans ever get out of their conflicts 
and integrate into the world political and economic systems? 
Scholars have suggested several explanations for Africa's political instability and 
military interventions including, political development theory, military centrality theory, 
ethnic antagonism theory, and world system/dependency theory. 
Although I do not rule out that any of these causal mechanisms theories have 
contributed to some extent to Africa's political instability. However, in my opinion, these 
theories underestimate the significant role played by colonial experience in shaping African 
political culture. 
By using Chad and the Sudan as comparative case studies of former colonies of 
France and Britain, the thesis illustrates the relevance of my colonial-legacy theory. Chad 
and the Sudan are almost similar in every aspect except the former colonial power. 
Variations in the patterns of their civil-military relations are explained by variations in the 
nature of their colonial experiences. 
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This thesis examines the impact of colonial rule and its legacy on the patterns of 
civil-military relations and on the stability of elected civilian regimes in African countries 
after independence. I make a comparative analysis between Chad (a former French colony) 
and the Sudan (a former British colony) to show how the colonial legacy played and 
continues to play a major role in shaping civil-military relations in those countries. 
This thesis argues that among other factors, the colonial legacy played a major 
role in shaping civil-military relations in post-colonial Africa. African countries have been 
outstandingly characterized by the instability of their elected civilian regimes. Why is that? 
Is it because of their economic backwardness? The lack of education? The multi-etJ:micity 
and tribalism? Domestic traditions and civic culture? Or other reasons? In fact all these are 
important sources of political instability. However, the legacy of colonial rule, whether the 
colonial powers deliberately aimed to do so or not, played a significant role in irrigating 
the pre-existing seeds of instability and turning them into complex and chronic problems. 
Africa has witnessed some of the worst examples of civil-military relations in the 
world. It is characterized by continuous military coups, weak unstable civilian regimes, 
and frequent reverses after attempts at democratization. Scholars have failed to find a 
common explanation to this pattern that would be applicable across all Mrican countries. 
Most of the time they have ignored the effect of the colonial legacy as a possible cause for 
this pattern. Yet, Africa is an area that has been significantly affected by colonialism, and 
colonial rule was the last experience it had before attempts at democratization. Moreover, 
the influence of the former colonizer is still significant in "Francophone Africa" in an 
obvious manner. 
Chad and the Sudan represent the French and the British colonial experiences 
(respectively), the two main former colonial powers in the Africa. Chad and the Sudan 
have many similarities and unique qualifications which render them representative in this 
comparative case study: they are both central African countries and their central 
geographic position enables them to represent all the other African countries; they are 
both exposed to the Arabic and Islamic culture in their northern part, and the African 
Xlll 
and Christian culture in their southern part. The type of colonization is the major 
difference between the two countries. It is my argument that variation in the type of 
colonial experience is the most important factor in the varying make-up of civil-military 
relations in Chad and the Sudan. 
In both Chad and the Sudan, the colonial experience was found to be a major 
cause for the instability of civilian regimes and the military interventions. However, the 
frequency of military interventions and the direct circumstances that stimulated military 
coups in Chad and the Sudan differed according to the differences in the policies of their 
former colonizers (France and Britain). 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
In this thesis, I will examine the impact of the colonial experience in Africa and 
its effect on the stability of civilian-led regimes and its role in military interventions in 
African politics after independence. I will provide a comparative case study between 
Chad (a former French colony) and the Sudan (a former British colony) to show how the 
colonial legacy has played a major role in shaping civil-military relations in the two 
countries. 
This study is important, I think, because Africa has witnessed some of the worst 
examples of civil-military relations in the world. 1 Africa is characterized by frequent 
military coups, weak unstable civilian regimes, and continual setbacks after attempts at 
democratization. Previous Studies found that: 
a coup or attempted coup occurred once every 4 months in Latin America 
(between 1945 and 1972), once every 7 months in Asia (1947-1972), once 
every 3 months in the Middle East (1949-1972), and once every 55 days in 
Africa (1960-1972)_2 
Scholars have failed to agree on an explanation of this pattern that would be 
generally applicable to all African countries. Although Africa is an area greatly affected 
by colonialism, and colonial rule was the last governing experience most of Africa had 
before attempts at democratization, scholars have tended to ignore the effect of the 
colonial legacy as a possible cause for African patterns of military interventions and 
political instability .. 
1 Augustine J. Kposowa and J. Craig Jenkins reported in their study of"The Structural Sources of Military 
Coups in Post-colonial Africa, 1957-1984" that "[B]etween their independence and 1985, the 45 African 
states had had 6o successful military seizures, 71 attempts, and 126 reported plots. By the mid-1980s, 25 of 
these states were directly controlled by the military and over 90% had experienced at least one coup 
event." American Journal of Sociology, Volume 99, Number 1, July 1993, p. 126. 
2 
"Global-level studies have consistently found Africa the region most prone to coups (Finer 1988; 
Janowitz 1977; Thompson 1973). Bertsch, Clark, and Wood (1978, p. 431)." Ibid. p. 127. 
1. 
A. ARGUMENTS 
This thesis will argue that the colonial legacy was one of the most significant 
elements that determined the factors or exacerbated the pre..:existing factors that were to 
shape civil-military relations in Africa. 
The political culture that developed during the colonial period has been one of the 
general causes for the instability of African civilian-led regimes.3 Unlike French direct 
rule, British colonial indirect rule made the distance between the upper class( civilian 
politicians) and the lower class (military and common people) of society even greater. 
However, in both the French and British cases, the colonial educational and missionary 
policy intensified the ethnic and cultural diversity. These ethnically, culturally, and 
religiously distinct people were put together in the same artificial states at independence. 
In this thesis I will argue that the instability of civilian regimes, the military coups, and 
the civil-wars in both Chad and the Sudan were likely to be products of these legacies of 
their colonial periods. 
Unlike the British case, the French assimilation policy4 has led to an incomplete 
decolonization, and hence neocolonialism and post-colonial influence up to this day. 
Recently, France has been using this influence in democratization efforts in her former 
African colonies. That is because, most of these countries, if not all, depend heavily on 
France in their economic, military, and political affairs. Chadian democracy is highly 
influenced by French pressure. On the other hand, the British decolonization was 
comparatively complete. That is why Britain currently does not have much influence on 
her former colonies to force them towards the democratization process. Britain has a very 
small role, if any, to play in Sudan's current situation. 
3 Stedman also argued that "[T]he roots of Africa's violence lie principally with the political and economic 
conditions that existed after independence." Stedman, Stephen John, "Conflict and Conciliation in Sub-
Saharan Africa", in Brown, Michael, ed. International Dimensions oflntemal Conflict, The MIT Press, 
Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1996, p. 238. 




B. PAST WORK AND REVIEW OF OTHER ARGUMENTS 
There are four main theories offered by different scholars as possible explanations 
for Africa's patterns of civil-military relations.5 
First is the political development theory (Huntington 1968; Barrows 1976; Kasfir 
1976; Jackman 1978; Collier 1983).6 This theory suggests that the new African nations 
confronted participatory crises stemming from the tension between an increasing 
mobilized citizenry and weak political institutions. That is, high participation and level of 
demands but a lack of strong political institutions. Thus, ineffective rule which caused the 
military to meddle more and more in the political process and ultimately intervened. 
Second is the military centrality theory (Andreski 1969; Wells 1974; Janowitz 
1977; Nordlinger 1977; Finer 1988; Wells and Pollnac 1988).7 Its main idea is that 
resourceful and cohesive militaries are more likely to intervene, with a greater likelihood 
when the military is factionalized or when the budget and size of the military is larger. 
Third is ethnic antagonism theory (Morrison and Stevenson 1972a, 1972b; 
McGowan 1975; Jackman 1978; Jenkins and Kposowa 1990).8 It suggests three main 
causes of coups: (1) ethnic plurality, where the instability of political conditions is 
positively related to the number of groups and their cultural heterogeneity; (2) ethnic 
dominance, where the existence of an hegemonic group provokes tensions and then 
coups; and (3) ethnic competition, where state building and economic development 
simultaneously increase the competition between groups and provides greater resources; 
the likelihood of coup is high when the two largest groups are roughly comparable in 
size. 
Fourth is world system/dependency theory (O'Donnell 1979; O'Kane 1981, 1983; 
Thomas 1984; Johnson, Slater, and McGowan 1984; Jenkins and Kposowa 1990; 
Neuhauser 1992).9 It argues that the persistence of colonial trading patterns creates low 
5 This review benefited from the article by Augustine J. Kposowa (Wayne State University) and J. Craig 
Jenkins (Ohio State University) "The Structural Sources of Military Coups." 
6 Ibid, p. 127. 
7 Ibid, p. 127. 
8 Ibid, p. 127. 
9 Ibid, p. 127. 
3 
and unstable profits, economic stagnation, and poverty, and thereby political turmoil and 
military intervention. 
I do not reject the possible influence of any of these arguments. However, there is 
a fundamental question which must be posed; are these theories exceptionally applicable 
for Africa and not applicable for the other regions that are undergoing military 
interventions? If yes, why?; and if no, then these theories do not yet answer the question 
(why Africa is outstanding in its frequency of military interventions?). 
In this thesis I will raise these questions and suggest an alternative argument that 
may help us better understand Africa's awkward position of civil-military relations. Let 
us see what Africa has different from the rest of the world. Let us look at the development 
of Africa's political culture and in particular at the impact of the colonial experience and 
its legacy on the African attitudes. This is the subject of this thesis. 
C. THEORETICAL APPROACH 
This thesis will employ Robert Putam's theory of the importance of political 
culture and civic society to make democratic institutions work. In his case study of Italy, 
Putnam traced the roots of civic community to explore how the Southern autocratic 
political arrangements were different from those in the Northern part of Italy. He found 
that political institutions worked effectively· in northern Italy but did. not work in the 
South for several reasons. First, in the North, feudal bonds of personal dependence were 
weakened; while in the South, they were strengthened. 10 That is, in northern Italy people 
were citizens, while in the South they were subjects of feudalism. Likewise, in Africa, 
people were subjects of the kings, tribal chiefs, and colonial rulers, rather than citizens. 
Second, legitimate authority in northern Italy was delegated only to public 
officials, who remained responsible to those whose affairs they were entrusted, while 
legitimate authority in the South was monopolized by the king, who was responsible only 
to God. The same was true in Africa: the kings before colonialism and the governors 
during colonial rule were not at all accountable to their population. 
4 
Third, in Northern Italy, Putnam found that the crucial social, political, and 
religious allegiances and alignments were horizontal. That is, in the hierarchy of orders 
and instructions that were to be executed without questioning. While those allegiances in 
the South were vertical or negotiated ones. Most of these relations in Africa were vertical 
during the colonial period, and subsequently remained vertical after independence. In 
fact, the absence of human capital (Putnam's key point) in Africa, which was severely 
exacerbated by slavery, colonial subjection, and the culture of patron-clientalism, 
provided the foundation for its economic and political backwardness. 
D. JUSTIFICATION OF THE CASES AND METHODOLOGY 
I have chosen France and Britain in my comparative case study because they were 
the main colonizers of Africa, and they had a more significant impact on African 
countries than other outside powers due to their colonial experience. Also I chose Chad 
and the Sudan as representative cases because there are several similarities between them: 
1) they are both central African countries, which are exposed both to the Arabic and 
Islamic culture in their northern parts, and to the African and Christian culture in their 
southern parts; 2) they have the same geographical structures, in addition to sharing a 
very long border, through which people pass most of the time freely and without any 
control; and 3) a large number of the same tribes live in the two countries. I think the type 
of colonization is the only major difference. In fact, it is my argument that the type of 
colonial experience is the most important factor that has made a significant difference in 
the makeup of civil-military relations between the two countries. 
In the first part of this thesis, I will deliver a general comparative analysis of the 
French and British colonial experiences in Africa in terms of the objectives, the nature of 
the respective colonial rule, the major legacies, the decolonization process, and the post-
colonial influence. In the second part, I will show how these legacies are applicable to 
Chad and the Sudan throughout the colonial experience, the decolonization process, the 
10Putnam, Robert. Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy, Princeton University Press, 
Princeton, New Jersey, 1994, pp. 121-136. 
5 
interchange among regimes after independence, the civil wars, and the post-colonial 
relations with their former colonial powers. 
6 
II. FRANCE AND BRITAIN IN AFRICA 
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11 Wilson, Henry S. The Imperial Experience in Sub-Saharan Africa Since 1870, Volume III, University of 
Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, 1977, p. 271. 
7 
At the beginning of the nineteenth century, European countries competed to 
conquer Africa to support the industrial development that was taking place everywhere in 
Europe. 12 The main goals in the colonization of Africa were: to provide European firms 
with cheaply produced raw materials and cheap labor; to find markets for the products of 
their factories; and to establish routes across Africa in order to shorten the route to their 
Asian colonies such as India. 13 Additionally, they wanted to increase their self-sufficiency 
by occupying as much territory as possible in the colonies. 14 
For instance, France occupied 10 million square kilometers of territory that was 
home to 48 million inhabitants, including the territory that became most of the countries 
of West and Central Africa, such as, Senegal, Mauritania, Mali, Burkina Faso, Togo, 
Benin, Gabon, Niger, Chad, Central African Republic, Congo, Guinea, and Cote 
· d'Ivoire. 15 'The un-set sun,' Great Britain occupied 30 million square kilometers, home to 
400 million inhabitants. These territories included (in Africa) Sudan, Uganda, Tanzania, 
Kenya, Zambia, Malawi, Ghana, Nigeria, Botswana, South Africa, and Somalia. 
In Africa, France occupied mainly the vast desert, while Britain· occupied 
selectively along the coasts and the area of the Nile and the Great Lakes. Given the 
barrenness of the desert, the French motives were probably more nationalistic than 
economic. 16 That is, France was more concerned about the size of her colonies compared 
to the other European powers, and about filling the power vacuums among her occupied 
colonial territories. In contrast, the British were more concerned about economic assets, 
and that is why they had colonized areas that were rich in resources and commercially 
12 McNamara, France in Black Africa, p. 25. See "the Accident ofFashoda." 
13 Cape Town in South Africa was used to be the shortest passage to. Indian Ocean, before the conquest of 
Egypt and the construction of the Suez Canal. 
14 The French Minister of Foreign Affairs (1883-1885), Jules Ferry, believed that colonialism was a way 
to reinforce France's international prestige; "Colonial policies are the international manifestation of the 
eternal laws of competitiveness." "Colonialism," in the Encyclopedia Universalis Vol. 4, Paris, 1980, p. 
709. 
15 Djibouti and Madagascar were the exceptions. 
16 Porch, Douglas. The Conquest of the Sahara, The Trinity Press, Worcester and London, 1985, p. 11. 
Porch argues that econornic.motives for colonialism were less important than national honor. See his 
answer to: "Why did France, then, conquer the Sahara?" p. 10. 
8 
strategic. However, unlike the French colonies, the British colonies were geographically 
separated. 
Although some scholars have argued that colonialism was a humanitarian and 
civilizing mission, these objectives suggest that the bottom line for colonial powers was 
their own interests. So depending on what was good for them, colonial powers could not 
be blamed for their legacies that I will discuss soon, because improvement of civil-
military relations and good governance were not a part of their agenda. A close 
examination of the colonial rule can illustrate this argument. 
9 
A. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF PRE-COLONIAL AFRICA 
Map 2: Culture areas of Africa. 17 
I 
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17 Wilson, HenryS. The Imperial Experience in Sub-Saharan Africa Since 1870, Volume III, University of 
Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, 1977, p. 10. 
10 
Variations in geographical and environmental conditions dictated the emergence 
of distinct cultural regions in pre-colonial Africa. Henry Wilson argued that "[H]istory is 
grounded in geography and nowhere more so than in Africa."18 Accordingly, before 
colonialism, the following African cultural regions existed (see Map 2.): North Africa, 
the desert, Egypt, Bilad al-Sudan, the gold coast (Guinea), tropical Africa (Congo), 
southern Africa, and eastern Africa. 
1. African Pre-Colonial Empires and Civilizations 
Despite the simplistic perception that some might have about Africa, which might 
be due to the history they only learned about the transatlantic slave trade, "[A ]frican 
societies possessed an internal dynamic of change that persisted through and beyond the 
colonial period."19 Pre-colonial African societies exhibited great diversity, comprising 
city-states and self-governing villages alongside sizable nations with distinctive political 
structures. 20 
Although the modem African states have only existed after the colonial period, 
most of the African societies existed in pre-colonial Africa within organized empires, 
kingdoms, and small communities controlled by local tribal chiefs.21 However, there were 
few, if any, democratic values of ruling. All rulers tended to be authoritarian and of 
historically inherited, religious, or conquered legitimacy, rather than accountability 
towards the people they rule. The colonial military rule was experienced in the same 
.'undemocratic' manner. Many scholars have neglected the background of the African 
political culture, which is important in understanding the current African vulnerability to 
authoritarian and military rule. 
Moreover, many African pre-colonial societies had contacts with the rest of the 
world and they possessed distinct civilizations and religious identities. 
18 Ibid, p. 3. 
19 Ibid, p. 12. Wilson also wrote that "historians and anthropologists that use the term 'traditional Africa' as 
synonymous with 'pre-colonial Africa' is distinctly misleading [and] tends to compress [the diversity of 
African societies] into conformity with the user's simplistic perception of pre-colonial Africa." p. 24. 
20 Ibid, p. 24. 
11 
For instance, some secrets of the Ancient Egyptians' civilization are not yet 
known despite today's technology and advanced science. How did the Ancient Egyptians 
build the pyramids? How could they lift the huge stones of the pyramids and put them 
together? How could they make the coffins of their kings so that the body is kept fresh 
over thousands of years? So far nobody knows. 
2. The Effect of Religion on Pre-Colonial African Cultures 
Many of the cultural traditions of African societies have been affected by other 
civilizations existing in the past long before any sailing ship from Europe reached the 
African coasts. Christianity and Islam were of significant effect. For instance, John Iliffe, 
Professor of African History at the University of Cambridge, reported that "North 
Africans adapted Christianity and Islam to their own cultures and transmitted both 
religions to black Africa, where centuries of internal development had prepared social 
environments for their reception and further adaptation."22 
Christianity was brought to Alexandria in AD 61. "By AD 400, perhaps 90 per 
cent of Egyptians were Christians."23 The Kingdoms of Old Dongola, Meroe, Alwa, and 
Nobia (the recent northern Sudan) all became Christian kingdoms.24 Christianity also 
covered the kingdom of Aksum in northern Ethiopia, which would even survive the 
Islamic and the European invasions afterward. 
The Sudanic lands to the south of the Sahara were in touch with those of the 
Mediterranean. This contact resulted not only in the exchange of produce, but also in the 
sharing of skills and ideas. Roland Oliver and Anthony Atmore have a good summary of 
inter-religious and inter-cultural communication in North, West, and Central Africa: 
While the Latin Christianity of the Roman provinces never crossed the 
Sahara, Greek-speaking missionaries, both Orthodox and Monophysite, 
converted the Nubian Kingdoms on the upper Nile and the kingdom of 
Aksum in northern Ethiopia. In the west Islam, from its first spread 
21 Henry Wilson, in "African Empires" discussed, among others, the Zulu Kingdom and the Afrikaner 
Trekker Republics in South Africa, and the West African Jihads. Ibid, pp. 24-30. 
22 Iliffe, John. Africans: The History of a Continent, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1995, p. 37. 
23 Ibid, p. 39. 
24 Ibid, p. 39. 
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through the conquest of Egypt and North Africa in the seventh century, 
moved on across the desert with little delay. 
By the ninth century the nomads of the central and western Sahara were 
converting to Islam. By the eleventh century at least, the new faith was 
beginning to penetrate the negro kingdoms of the desert, where it appealed 
first and foremost to those who traveled beyond their own communities 
and language areas as participants in an already active system of regional 
and inter-regional trade. To these Islam offered wider intellectual and 
spiritual horizons and membership of a universal brotherhood which 
looked after its members in very practical ways. Between the eleventh 
century and the eighteenth at least, the townsfolk of the Sudanic countries 
learned to be Muslims like the Arabs and the Berbers to the north. Their 
learned and pious men studied Arabic, the language of the Holy Koran, 
and a few made the pilgrimage to the holy cities of Mecca and Medina, 
passing through the great cities of Egypt and North Africa on the way. The 
rulers and the rich men on both sides of the desert worshipped the One 
God, read the same book, discussed the same things.25 
However, in tropical Africa, geographical conditions such as the forest, wild 
animals, and tropical diseases created a barrier against any further religious and cultural 
spread. Africans in these areas were more traditional when the European invasion 
occurred. In fact, even European invaders suffered from these geographical conditions in 
conquering tropical Africa. 
This historical background of pre-colonial Africa recognizes the existence of 
authoritarian rule as well as the cultural, ethnic, and religious diversity of African 
societies before colonialism. However, the activities of colonial powers are more directly 
. responsible for the pathologies that plagued post-colonial regimes. That is because they 
the colonizers exacerbated those pre-existing policies and misused them for their colonial 
rule. 
B. THE FRENCH AND BRITISH COLONIAL RULE IN AFRICA 
Although pre-colonial Africa was not governed by democratic institutions, I argue 
that colonial rule, generally and in most of its specific functions (administrative, legal, 
and educational), was the training ground for the future maintenance of the culture of 
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arbitrary rule. That is, those who became the first generation of African leaders were 
taught the methods of military and personal rule during the colonial period, while at the 
same time, African people became accustomed to military regimes. 
I will take the French and British colonial administration, legal system, and 
education as examples to explain how the colonial rule disfavored democratic civil 
military relations. 
1. Administration 
In both the French and· British colonies, the Governor General was also the 
commander-in-chief of the colonial military. He had the ultimate power to run the 
colonies, keep order, and achieve the colonial objectives. Although the British, in some 
ways, had run their administration differently, the legacies they left are similar to those of 
France in many aspects. However, the French post-colonial influence or the 
neocolonialism is a major difference from the British case. 26 
In the French colonies, the "post-conquest period has been characterized as one of 
triumphant [barrack-room authoritarianism], as many of the first civil administrators 
came from the marines and military influence permeated the rest.'m The notorious code 
of colonial administrative sanctions led to the application of French military code to the 
colonies, giving administrators precisely the same right to discipline their underlings as 
commissioned military officers had to exercise summary judgment on other ranks. 
Moreover, the French refusal to allow for local diversity led to the attempt to construct a 
strictly bureaucratic hierarchy from governor-general down to village chief based on the 
model ofthe army.28 
25 Oliver, Roland and Anthony Atmore. Africa Since 1800, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1994, 
p. 3. 
26 The French philosophy of colonialism was evolved from Pacification, to Administration, to Assimilation 
and Association, and ended up with Cooperation; the post-colonial influence lies in this different 
philosophical approach (from that of the British). See McNamara, France in Black Africa, pp.26-32, and 
95. 
27 Wilson, The Imperial Experience in Sub-Saharan Africa, p. 128. 
28 Pierre, Alexander. Chiefs Commandants and Clerks, Africana Publishing Corporation, New York, 
1970, pp. 2-13. 
14 
Similarly, in the British colonies, the governors of the different provinces were all 
military officers, who enjoyed wide powers in the internal administration of their 
provinces with little interference from the central government. There were fewer civilians 
than military officials to assist the Governor-General. This military rule was 
institutionalized by the government in the home country. That is, "[t]he British Colonial 
Office was attached to the War Office when it was created in 1801."29 
The French government had attempted to increase the initiative of local 
authorities and to convert the Colonial Office into an organ of control as it was in the 
British Empire. This attempt materialized through the grouping of the various colonies 
into two federations: 'Afrique Occidentale Fran9aise' (A.O.F.), and 'Afrique Equatoriale 
Fran9aise'(A.E.F.), with capitals at Dakar and Brazzaville respectively.30 In contrast to 
the British separate enclaves, French West Africa (A.O.F.) was consh'ucted as a solid 
bloc. French officials found themselves increasingly involved in conflict with the 
indigenous rulers once they intervened in the internal affairs of the ·chiefdoms. That is 
why they "abandoned the informal indirect rule they had adopted during the occupation 
of the interior through paper protectorates."31 Assimilation was the alternative policy 
pursued. Although they gave the local chiefs some status "the canton chiefs", the 
authority of the canton chiefs in the French new 'semi-indirect' rule was far less than that 
in the British indirect rule. 
The British, in order to apply their policy of the 'indirect rule', sought to leave" ... 
the native population free to manage their own affairs through their own rulers ... under 
the guidance of the British staff, and subject to the laws and policy of the. 
administration.m2 However, the governor-general retained his ultimate power of making 
all the major decisions. Ultimately, this constituted not only a military rule, but also one-
person rule. 
29 Fetter, Bruce. Colonial Rule in Africa, The University of Wisconsin Press, London, 1979, p. 9. 
30 Ibid, p. 102. 
31 Wilson, The Imperial Experience, p. 128. 
32 Fetter, Colonial Rule in Africa, p. 96. 
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In sum, both the French and British colonial administrations provided some 
ground for the current cycle of African authoritarian regimes and military interventions in 
politics. 
2. The Legal System 
In both the French and British colonies, the laws were made by the Governors-
General, and there was an advisory group to help them. For instance, the governor-
general of French Equatorial Africa (A.E.F.) was the 'reference' for colonial justice, 
which was itself often oppressive. That is, the governor-general did not only have 
executive and legislative powers, but also the final judicial authority. Moreover, most of 
the other officials, such as the district officers, were brutal and suppressive. Yet, the 
citizens could not question them. John Iliffe notes that "many early officials were brutal 
men, recruited because they were available."33 
Likewise, in the British colonies, the Governor had a council composed of the 
governor, 15 official members, and 14 unofficial members. The governors ofthe different 
provinces were left to rule their regions at their own discretion and with the guidance of 
circulars drawn up by the Governor General. The criminal law was framed in a simple 
way so that it could be understood by the military officers responsible for its application. 
Appeals were made to the Governor General. Similar to the French case, the Governor 
General in the British colonies had the legislative, executive, and judicial authority at the 
same time. A~so the officials in the lower echelon, including the native chiefs who were 
given some responsibilities to assist the colonial authorities, had free hand over the 
citizens. Most of these officials misused the power they had, but nobody could ask them. 
In fact, the concepts of human rights and rule of law were not there, in colonial 
Africa. I think, the unification of legislative and executive power, intervention of leaders 
in judicial process, and human rights abuses oftoday's Africa is a continuity of the same 
political culture that existed in the colonial Africa. That is, after such an experience, 
which had continued for about a century, we should not be surprised to see African 
33 Iliffe, Africans, p. 198. 
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officers, who in most cases originally trained and commissioned in colonial military, 
willing to test what they had seen before. Also, this seizure of power should not have 
been expected to, and actually did not, surprise the citizens who became accustomed to 
that type of rule over a long period of time. 
3. Education, Religion, and Missionaries 
In pre-colonial Africa, political instability and civil wars occurred largely due to 
ignorance and ethnic intolerance. The educational policy in both French and British 
colonial states aimed deliberately at qualifying only a few Africans for positions in the 
colonial administration. In fact, since it was not on the colonial agenda, education was 
left to the religious missions, and even the goal of the education provided by those 
missionaries was just to train Africans in basic skills (often clerical) so that they could 
serve in the administration of the colonies. That is, as Henry Wilson - the historian and 
Africa expert - has stated, "France required Africans to help her officials in the lower 
echelons of the new imperial apparatus".34 
Likewise, the education system in the British colonies depended on religious 
missions. Bruce Fetter notes that "[e]ducation in British Africa had been left largely in 
the hands of missions."35 Although the missionaries did not want to give up their 
educational role, they did hope that the Colonial Office would take over certain 
administrative responsibilities. 
This policy created a division between Arabic-speaking Muslims and the English-
speaking Christians, so typical of many places in Africa. This is because the missionary 
education was applied in selected regions and within selected ethnic groups, while other 
regions and other ethnic groups were prohibited from such an education. They were left 
either without formal education or with only traditional Islamic and Arabic education. 
This experience, in tum, certainly contributed to the creation of distinct cultural, 
34 Wilson, The Imperial Experience in Sub-Saharan Africa, p.235 
35 Fetter, Colonial Rule in Africa, p.130. 
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religious, and linguistic differences within the same country, and later became one of the 
major sources of ethnic problems on the continent.36 
These ethnic conflicts were one of the major sources for military interventions and 
civil Wars. Although some of the religious, linguistic, and economic differences already 
existed, the colonial education policy helped to exacerbate them. 
C. COLONIAL LEGACIES AND CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS 
Although in some places the colonial powers brought beneficial changes,37 they 
also provided an unfavorable environment for political stability and peace. Scholars have 
proposed some possible reasons for military interventions and explanations of civilian 
control of African militaries. However, as Harvard professor Jendayi Frazer contends, 
" ... explanations of civilian control in Africa are far less developed. Rather, there is an 
implicit assumption in the literature that eliminating the perceived causes of military 
intervention will automatically lead to civilian control."38 
Arguments have been made that institutional weaknesses, economic 
backwardness, and multi-ethnicity, were the main causes for military coups in Africa.39 In 
my opinion, however, the nature of Africa's state-society relations that were inherited 
from the colonial administration, the colonial educational system, the legal system, and 
the artificial nation-states at decolonization were the main causes for Africa's military 
interventions. Moreover, I think these factors also explain why African citizens accept, 
and at times, even support military coups. 
36 Henry L. Bretton made a comprehensive analysis for the Nigerian case, which is a typical example in 
many African countries. He explained how the British governed the northern (Islam) part of the country 
differently from the southern (Christianity) and the eastern (Animism) parts. Bretton found that "[I]n all 
three instances, the intention of British administrative policy apparently was to make the predominant 
power structure and underlying social systems compatible with the requirements of the colonial rule." 
Power and Stability in Nigeria: The Politics ofDecolonization, Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., New York, 
1962. p. 12. 
37 Before decolonization, for instance, most of the colonial powers stopped the slavery trade and provided 
some infrastructure such as railroads, bridges, disease control, and political institutions. 
38 Frazer, Jendayi Elizabeth. Sustaining Civilian Control: Armed Counterweight in Regime Stability in 
Africa, Stanford University, Ph.D. Dissertation, 1990, p. 5. 
39 Jendayi Elizabeth Frazer summarized in "Explanations for Coups D'Etat [in Sub-Saharan Africa]" the 
different arguments made by scholars. She mentioned institutional explanations, economic explanations, 
socio-political explanations, and political-institutional explanations. Ibid, pp. 6-19. 
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Rather than the common, critical, and determinant factors of continual coups in 
Africa, the causes that have been proposed by different scholars are more likely to be 
either: 1) auxiliary or co-factors, which better illustrate the variations in relative stability 
between the countries undergoing coups, or 2) factors that were themselves either caused 
or exacerbated by the colonial experience. 
There are, at least, four major colonial legacies that illustrate the arguments I have 
made so far in this thesis: a political culture of authoritarian rule, a new shape of class 
structure, deepened ethnic tensions, and artificial nation-states. 
1. Political Culture of Authoritarian Rule 
Generally, most if not all of Africa was conquered militarily and ruled for several 
decades under colonial military rule. This rule was cru.Tied out by 'the general chiefs' of 
the colonial army who became governors. The culture of acceptance of arbitrary rule (in 
general) and of military rule (in particular) was either developed or confirmed under the 
colonial experience in both the French and British cases. At the same time that Europe 
was enjoying the fruits of democracy, European militaries were ruling colonies in Africa 
with an iron fist. The subsequent effects on the political culture that emerged through this 
experience of several decades cannot be ignored. 
Although the colonial rulers finally at independence tried to leave behind 
institutions similar to their own in the independent states after decolonization, those 
institutions did not work as expected. In my opinion, it is important to acknowledge that 
these democratic institutions did well with respect to the time period in which they took · 
place and the colonial legacy that accompanied them.40 That is because democratic 
institutions are more likely to rest on a healthy civil society.41 
Civil society was not there in Africa. In fact, the cultures in Africa were generally 
completely anti-democratic cultures that developed before and throughout the years of 
40 In both French and British colonies, democratic institutions were introduced gradually after World War 
II and they were never complete until independence. The whole process took less than one decade in most 
of the African countries. 
41Fukuyama, Francis. "The Primacy of Culture," Journal ofDemocracy Volume 6, Number 1 January 
1995, p.8. 
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colonial experience. Given this background, why should we have expected these 
European institutions to solve all such problems. 
Post-colonial democratic institutions have competed with authoritarian systems 
and systematically alternated with them in many African countries. This took place in the 
environment of the Cold War, which also had a negative effect on democratization in 
Africa. 
Overall, scholars and politicians seem to have set their expectations too high and 
failed to take into account the colonial experience in African history and the true 
circumstances of Africa's path toward democratization. 
2. Class Structure 
In addition to depending on the military, colonial rule depended upon traditional 
leaders - such as kings, tribal chiefs, and religious figures - to rule their colonies. Those 
chiefs and their sons had opportunities to occupy administrative posts, higher education 
(particularly overseas, such as Paris and London), better economic status, and 
consequently better chances for political participation as leaders. They formed the upper 
. class of society, having the monopoly on political power, financial means, and higher 
social status. Eventually, the state became not only a syffibol for political power, but also 
a center for economic resources. With the failure of Africa's post-colonial democratic 
institutions to provide fair distribution of political power and economic resources, 
military interventions became critical means for gaining political power and economic 
resources. In "Conflict and Conciliation in Sub-Saharan Africa", Stephen John Stedman 
argued that: 
Africa's recent conflicts have arisen from long-term permissive conditions 
and more immediate proximate causes. Legacies from colonialism 
predisposed much of Africa to violent conflicts over the distribution of 
resources in societies, access to political power, and basic political 
identities. Such legacies helped to create a pattern of state and class 
formation. 42 
42 Stedman, Stephen John, "Conflict and Conciliation in Sub-Saharan Africa," in, p. 236. 
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.-------------------------------------------
This stratification of the society was more evident in the British colonies than in 
the French colonies. That is probably because the British had applied indirect rule in their 
colonies more than the French had. Unlike the French, the presence of the 'loyal' group 
of people in the British society, who always had the right to rule might be an explanation 
for this difference in their legacies. That is, through the indirect rule, the British gave a lot 
of loyalty to certain families and groups in their African colonies- similar to that of the 
British Royal Family. This privilege has been reflected in the leaders and the politicians 
of post-colonial Africa, most ofwhom came from these 'loyal' families or groups. There 
were more communist and socialist movements in the former British colonies than the 
former French colonies in Africa. I think, the same explanation is valid for this 
phenomenon. That is because communism is more common in societies where the 
working class has no or less opportunities as the bourgeoisie. Of course, communist 
ideology encourages military coups (as a revolutionary means to seize power). These 
communist and socialist organizations have politicized and factionalized military officers 
in many African countries and led them to military plots, attempts or successful coups. 
In Africa, as in many other places, the lower class was represented in the military 
and the poor masses of labor. There were very few people who constituted the African 
middle class. That is simply because there were very few Africans educated in the 
colonial states to be professionals. Stedman found that: 
Colonial neglect of education posed nearly intractable problems for 
Africa's new states. There were, for example, no more than 1,200 
university graduates in all of Sub-Saharan Africa in 1960. In Zaire, there 
were fewer than 20 college graduates at independence; in Zambia, only 
108 Africans had received university education. In Tanzania, [there were 
only twelve African civil engineers, eight African telecommunication 
engineers, nine African veterinarians and five African chemists. No 
Africans had been trained as geologists or mechanical or electrical 
engineers.] When the Portuguese left Angola in 1974, there were no 
African civil servants. When Mozambique became independent, there 
were three African Doctors and one African lawyer; ninety percent of the 
population was illiterate.43 
43 Ibid. pp. 241-242. 
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Of course, educated professionals are one of the main constituents of any middle 
class. Consequently, the military became a representative body of the 'majority' lower 
class, while the civilian politicians took the image of the 'privileged elite, who did not 
look after working class interests. 
In the post-colonial era, whenever there have been political crises, security 
problems, or economic stagnation in the country, the majority of the population have 
welcomed military interventions to liberate them from the weak, corrupt civilian regimes. 
Even some intellectuals (particularly those who claimed ideologies asking for the 
protection of the working class) have coordinated with the military institution to 
overthrow civilian regimes. That is why most of the military coups have been supported 
by the citizens, because they think the military might protect their interests since they are 
from the same class. 
3. Ethnic Tensions 
Under colonial rule, structural and regional inequalities emerged from the colonial 
policy of favoring some tribes and ethnic groups over others: a characteristic of a divide-
and-conquer policy. Those who were loyal to and cooperative with the colonial powers 
were treated better, and their regions received more resources, education, and 
representation in the armed forces. Consequently these people replaced the colonial rulers 
after independence. 
This divide-and-conquer policy added economic and political factors to the 
cultural, religious, and linguistic differences which had already been either shaped or 
exacerbated by the colonial educational policy. The result was really a complex dualism.44 
This is true for both the French and British cases. 
For instance, the French applied this policy in Chad and Bamako,45 and so did the 
British in places such as Nigeria and the Sudan. This policy not only created regional 
dualism but also frustration and hatred among the Africans of the same African post-
44 By "complex dualism" I mean an economic dualism that is associated with not only educational 
inequalities, but also with ethnic, religious, and cultural differences. 
45 McNamara, France in Black Africa, p. 14. 
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colonial states. Indeed, colonial rule was the main mechanism through which ethnic 
tensions were solidified and confirmed. Although ethnic diversity existed before 
colonization, inter-ethnic conflicts sharpened and became potential time-bombs for future 
problems as a result of the colonial policy. 
Subsequent African leaders continued to apply the same colonial policy to citizens 
from the other ethnic groups by their suppression and unfair allocation of political power, 
and thereby economic resources. That is, because of the lack of domestic economic 
capital, African states became important sources of resources, and hence political power 
became an important mean for access to economic resources.46 Eventually, at 
independence, Africa's new elites sought to harness the power of their states to be the 
lead instruments in their economies.47 Keller and Rothchild argue that "[t]hese 
inequalities are clearly the basis for the civil conflicts in Liberia, Somalia, Ethiopia, and 
Sudan."48 
Moreover, the ethnic inequalities spawned many rebel movements that brought 
down many civilian governments. Some of these ethnic groups seized power in different 
ways, including military means. This also explains why some agitated ethnic groups 
supported ethnically focused military interventions, which in turn, opened the door for 
several civil wars and more general instability in Africa.49 In such an environment, the 
logic of violence and military power is the major 'game in town.' 
46 Stedman argues that the first generation of African leaders compounded their political and economic 
underdevelopment by emphasizing the state as the leading engine for economic growth and insisting on 
national unity at the expense of sub-national ethnic and political identity. In fact, it is the same argument 
made by Basil Davidson in The Black Man's Burden, Times Books, New York, 1993. Stedman, "Conflict 
and Conciliation in Sub-Saharan Africa," in, p. 240. 
47 Also Larry Diamond observes that the state structures established by the colonial powers "dwarfed in 
wealth and power both existing social instructions and various new fragments of modern organization." 
Larry Diamond, "Class Formation in the Swollen African State," Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol. 
25, No.4., December 1987, p.570. 
48 Keller, J. and Rothchild Donald. Africa in the New International Order: Rethinking State Sovereignty 
and Regional Security, Lynne Rienner, Boulder, Colorado, London, 1996, p.5. 
49 Stephen John Stedman reported in his article "Conflict and Conciliation in Sub-Saharan Africa" (p. 237) 
that "[S]ince 1970s, Africa has been the site of many of the world's most deadly conflicts. Seven wars- in 
Angola, Ethiopia, Mozambique, Rwanda, Somalia, Sudan, and Uganda- took between 500,000 and 
1,000,000 lives each, either directly through battlefield casualties or indirectly through war-induced famine 
and disease. Two other conflicts, in Burundi and Liberia, took over 100,000 lives each. In 1995, there were 
five ongoing wars (in Angola, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Somalia, and Sudan), several countries that were 
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4. Arbitrary Borders 
The establishment of post-colonial, African national borders was not based on any 
rational standards. This process neither addressed the nationhood of the indigenous 
peoples, nor took into account any pre-colonial historical or geographical considerations. 
Some ethnic groups, tribes, and even families were divided into several states by mutual 
agreements of the colonial powers. 5° Keller notes that, 
... most of Africa's fifty-three states are multiethnic, artificial creations, 
largely the product of the European scramble for Africa in the late 1800s. 
The colonial powers divided the peoples in the territories they claimed 
according to administrative convenience rather than pre-colonial social or 
political arrangements.51 
Accordingly, African people were thrown together with other ethnic groups with 
which they had had few, if any, relationships. This separation has affected the stability of 
African regimes in a couple of ways. First, most of the dissatisfied groups found external 
support for their rebellions from their tribes and relatives in the neighboring countries, 
who acted as individuals or as governments. The problems of the Tutsi and Hutou in 
Rwanda, Burundi, and Zaire is an excellent example. This type of cross-border support 
encouraged the foundation of rebel movements and gave existing internal rebellions an 
external dimension. 
Second, some post-colonial military regimes created problems with neighboring 
states, claiming certain territories by citing old stories to create legitimacy for their rule. 
In fact, they used the same method to quell internal problems and draw popular attention 
to an external threat. Territorial disputes between Somalia and Ethiopia, Eritrea and 
Ethiopia, and Cameroon and Nigeria fall into this category. 
Although they were aware of the arbitrariness of these borders, African nationalist 
leaders accepted them during the struggle for independence as the quickest route to the 
candidates for state collapse or civil war (Burundi, Cameroon, Kenya, Nigeria, Rwanda, Togo, and Zaire), 
and a host of other countries where low-level ethnic and political conflict remained contained, but unsolved 
(Chad, Congo, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Malawi, Mali, Mozambique, Senegal, South Africa, and Uganda). 
50 See "Colonialism and Independence," in Perkins and Snodgrass, Economics of Development, 3d ed., W. 
W. Norton and Company, New York and London, 1992, pp. 20-21. 
51 Keller and Rothchild, Africa in the New International Order, p. 4. 
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demise of colonial rule.52 In fact, "the charter ofthe Organization of African Unity (OAU) 
places great emphasis on the permanence of existing borders and the principle of 
territorial integrity."53 Moreover, most African societies have, for the sake of 
convenience, come to confer legitimacy upon these arbitrary state borders. In some 
instances, however, groups claiming the right to national self-determination have risen to 
challenge such arrangements. 
The illustration of the arbitrariness of African post-colonial borders does not 
suggest reconsideration or redrawing of these orders, because that might open a door for 
other conflicts. However, understanding of the arbitrariness of African borders and the 
way Africans were put in the different post-colonial states would provide a better 
explanation of the nature and the origin of some of the African conflicts. 
D. THE POST-COLONIAL INFLUENCE OF FORMER COLONIZERS 
Economic and political dependency on former colonizers is one of the main 
differences between the former French and British colonies. That is, France still remained 
the main partner to her former African colonies, while Britain did not. However, in the 
context of the cold war, many of the post-colonial African states depended on either the 
United States or the Soviet Union. 54 In fact, Britain lost more ofher former colonies to the 
Cold War than France did. This also illustrates France's ability to maintain its influence 
in her former colonies. 
5tThe slogan in many places became, " we must die as tribes so that we can be born as a nation." But 
practically it wasn't that easy. 
53 Stedman, "Conflict and Conciliation in Sub-Saharan Africa," in, p. 240. Although many analysts see that 
Africa does not suffer from inter-state wars, these unrealistic borders contributed to the internal instability. 
Michael Brown reported some examples to indicate the depth of the problem: "Nigeria's territory included 
3 major religions (Islam, Christianity, and Animis) and 250 ethnic groups, the largest three (Rausa Fulani, 
Y oruba, and Igbo) possessing vastly different political values and institutions. Zambia contained 72 ethno-
linguistic groups, Tanzania 120. Some states contained historical enemies. In Sudan, Arabs in the north had 
enslaved Nuer and Dinka in the south; in Rwanda and Burundi, Hutu lived under near-feudal submission to 
Tutsi. The borders of Ethiopia, Kenya, and Somalia divided ethnic and clan groups, thus prompting 
periodic irredentist struggles." Ibid. 
54 Stedman noticed that in post-colonial Africa, "[S]tate formation became based on ties to international 
fmancial institutions or external patrons, either the superpowers or former colonial masters." Ibid. pp. 242-
243. 
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The existence of the British commonwealth prior to the post-war decolonization 
movements facilitated Britain's ability to cope with demands for independence. However, 
France's Communaute did not succeed even though she tried to establish it along 
different and even more associative lines. By 1960, France was left with a network of 
bilateral relationships with its former colonies.55 An equivalent to membership in the 
British Commonwealth, of which the former colonies recognized the Crown as head, is 
something France was unable or unwilling to match in the early years after 
decolonization. 
The association of France and Francophone African states through summits and 
bilateral defense arrangements has preserved more of a residue of imperial power than the 
soft association of British Commonwealth states. While the lack of a pre-existing 
framework permitted France to take a case-by-case approach to establish strong bilateral 
ties, Britain's more systematic method of dealing with former possessions meant that the 
newly decolonized nations had the same status as older and larger members of the 
Commonwealth. 
France was unhindered by precedents in negotiating strong political, economic, 
and military links with each of its former colonies. In contrast, Britain was under strong 
moral and political pressure to grant African countries the same privileges as other 
Commonwealth members. As a result of this policy of equal distribution of autonomy, 
Britain was able to maintain some solidarity among its former colonies, while France 
proceeded more selectively. 
However, Britain failed to create an association with a strong center while France 
remains the undisputed hub of Francophone countries, especially those in Sub-Saharan 
Africa. That is, despite the solidarity of the members of the British Commonwealth, 
Britain was unable to influence the political, economic, and military events in these 
countries as France did in her Francophone community. 
55 
"In the early 1960s, France intervened to prop up regimes in Congo, Cameroon, Gabon, Mauritania, 
Niger, and Chad. However, the French military presence on the continent had dropped from 60,000 in 
1960 to 5,000 in the late 1960s." Keller and Rothchild, Africa in the New International Order, p. 10. 
26 
Another distinction between the French and British management of their former 
colonies lies in the use of common language. For France, the extent to which the world 
makes use of French and thereby takes the opportunity of assimilating French modes of 
thought is considered a measure of France's own standing in the world. This has given 
France a stronger influence over her former colonies than Britain. This does not mean 
that the British were not concerned with the use of English as a common language in their 
former colonies. However, the French were more serious, and they have committed to 
realize that concern. For instance, today, all the French former colonies in sub-Saharan 
Africa use French as their official national language. While English is not the official 
national language in all former British colonies of sub-Saharan Africa. 
There is an inverse incentive for the common use of a language within each these 
post-colonial relationships: in the Commonwealth, the main motive is the mutual 
advantage of all members to use English as . a common language, while in the 
Francophonie, it is mainly to France's benefit that the language be perpetuated among 
members. 56 Moreover, the burden of securing adhesion to a common language is carried 
by the individual members in the case of the Commonwealth, and by France itself in the 
case of the French-speaking countries. In other words; the French had more commitment 
than the British in maintaining their language, and were ready to pay the 'bill' for that. 
This was not a new policy for the French; it was a continuation of the association and 
assimilation policy during the colonial period. All these differences gave France a unique 
influence in her former colonies.57 That is why, unlike Britain, France not only has 
legacies in her former African colonies, but also a strong hand and some control over how 
these legacies play out as well. 
Dependency on former colonizers and the super powers of the Cold War created 
an environment in which military and authoritarian regimes relied on external support to 
reward internal allies and ignored the needs of their citizens. Stedman found that "[B]y 
the early 1980s, the survival of many African regimes depended on external, not internal, 
56Schraeder, Peter. US Foreign Policy Toward Africa, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1996, pp. 
217-219. 
57 Ibid, p. 217. 
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legitimacy."58 That is why " ... the end of the Cold War undermined the external sources of 
support for Africa's patrimonial regimes and left some with no legs to stand on."59 In the 
late 1980s, a new democratization wave in Africa coincidentally occurred with the end of 
the Cold War and the pressure of France on her former colonies towards democratic 
institutions. This wave suggests the importance of the post-colonial influence in Africa's 
civil-military relations. 
58 Stedman, "Conflict and Conciliation in Sub-Saharan Africa," in, p. 236. See also Robert H. Jackson and 
Carl G. Rosberg, "Why Africa's Weak States Persist: The Empirical and the Juridical in Statehood," in 
Atul Kohli, ed., The State and Development in the Third World, Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ, 
1986, pp. 259-282. 
59 Ibid. 
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III. CHAD AND THE SUDAN 
A. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
This historical background acknowledges some of the structural and cultural 
problems that were rooted far beyond the colonial experience. It also explains, however, 
that colonial policy exacerbated these problems, as we will see in the comparative case 
studies of Chad and the Sudan. 
1. Chad 
Chad is a former French colony in Central Africa. It links the Islamic and Arabic-
cultured Northern part of Africa, with its Christian African-cultured Southern part. 
French and Arabic are considered the official languages of the country, besides the more 
than 100 other languages and dialects that are spoken. The population of Chad, about six 
million, is comprised of 50 percent Muslims, 25 percent Christians, and 25 percent 
animists or atheists. 
In the prehistoric period, Chad was much wetter than it is today, as evidenced by 
large game animals depicted in rock paintings in the Tebesti and Borkou regions. Recent 
linguistic research suggests that "all of Africa's languages south of the Sahara Desert 
[except Khoisan] originated in prehistoric times in a narrow band between Lake Chad and 
the Nile Valley."6° Formation of states began across central Chad in the "Sahelian" zone 
in about 1,000 A. D. All states were militaristic, but none was able to expand far into 
southern Chad, where forests and the 'tsetse' fly, which causes sleeping sickness, 
complicated the use of cavalry. This is why southern Chad has less interaction with the 
rest of the world and was comparatively less developed than the North until the arrival of 
the French. Although many kingdoms rose and fell, the most important and durable of the 
empires were Kanem-Borno, Bagirmi, and Ouadai. 
60 Ibid., p.4. 
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Map 3: Administrative Divisions of Chad, 1988.61 
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61 Collelo, Thomas. Chad: A Countt:y Study, US Government Printing Office, Washington, DC, 1990, p. 
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The Kanem Empire originated in northeast Chad in about 800 A.D. Sef ibn Dhi, 
who was "believed to have broken off from the Zaghawa,"62 is the founder of Kanem 
Kingdom. It lasted until1812, when it was sacked by the Fulani.The Baguirmi Sultanate 
began in 1522 over the remains of the Bilala. Located between the powerful Kanem and 
Ouaddai empires, the Baguirmi were forced to pay tribute to these two neighbors. In 
1897, the Baguirmi were "forced to seek protectorate status from the French" in order to 
face the danger of the invading Sudanese forces under the leadership of Rabah Zubayr.63 
Thus, the Baguirmi Sultanate survived (as a canton) during French occupation. 
The Kingdom of Ouaddai was established by the non-Muslim Tounjours, a tribe 
from Darfur (recently the major region of western Sudan) in the sixteenth century. 
Between 1630 and 1640 some of their subjects(such as the Maba) supported Abd al-
Karim IV, an Arab invader from the Sudan, and revolted and established the new 
(Islamic) Ouaddai. Ouaddai gained greater control of trans-Saharan trade routes, and 
became dominant over both the Kanem and the Baguirmi by the year 1800. Ouaddai 
became a member of the Libyan Islamic 'Sannousiya' Brotherhood, and fought against 
French colonization.64 
This background shows that the people of northern part of Chad were more 
enlightened than the southerners because of their relatively developed kingdoms. All 
these kingdoms had administrative systems, organized armies, religious identities, and 
external relations (particularly with the Islamic world - which was at its peak of glory at 
that time). 
On the other hand, the Southern part was less developed, and still in a more 
traditional age. Geographical differences, I think, was the major factor that made these 
differences in modernization distinct. This was the situation that the colonial power had 
to deal with. This helps us understand why many things went in the way they did during 
the colonial experience. This also explains why France faced strong resistance in the 
62Nelson, et. al. Area Handbook for Chad, US Government Printing Office, Washington DC, 1972, p.25. 
63Ibid, p. 29. 
64Ibid, p. 30. 
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North, where people had already established civilizations, while it easily conquered the 
South, where the people were less organized. 
2. The Sudan 
Map 4: Administrative Divisions of Sudan, 1991.65 
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The Sudan is a former British colony in Central Africa. Like Chad, it is a very 
diverse country. Like Chad, it links the Islamic and Arabic northern parts of Africa with 
the Christian and English-speaking southern parts. Unlike Chad, Sudan's only official 
language is Arabic, while English is the second language. However, similar to Chad, 
more than 100 other local languages and dialects are spoken. The population of the 
Sudan, about 29 million, is comprised of more than 50 percent Muslims and about 16 
percent Christians. At least one-third still practice the indigenous religions of their 
ancestors. 66 
The Sudan has experienced throughout history different types of long-lasting, 
authoritarian kingdoms along the Nile river, such as: (1) the kingdom ofNapta (750-300 
B.C.), a royal family of Ethiopian origins that lasted for 300 years; (2) the kingdom of 
Meroe (350 B.C.-350 A.D.) which was divided into small kingdoms after 700 years; (3) 
the Christian kingdoms ofNuba (580-1504) through which Christianity entered the Sudan 
from Egypt and formed three kingdoms (Nubia, Makuria, Alawa); (4) the Fung Kingdom 
(1505-1775), an Islamic kingdom which replaced the Nuba after the immigration of the 
Arabs to the Sudan; (5) the Abdullah Sheikhdoms (1778-1820), who rebelled against the 
Fung and established their own kingdom; and (6) the Fur sultanate (in Darfur- the western 
Sudan), which replaced the Fung and was overthrown by the Turco-Egyptian 
condominium. All these kingdoms, excluding the first, were characterized by their 
religious orientation. 67 
Similar to Chad, all these kingdoms were in the northern part of the country. Also 
the southern part of the Sudan was less developed and more ~aditional. The same 
geographical conditions (such as the forest and tropical diseases) in the south probably 
represented the main barrier against inter-cultural communication between the North and 
South. Indeed, the distinct cultural differences between the two parts (in both Chad and 
the Sudan), dictated colonial policy, the legacy of which afterward shaped post-colonial 
politics. 
66 Ibid., p. 100. 
67Voll, John Obert and Sarah Votts. The Sudan: Unity and Diversity in a Multi-Cultural State, Westview 
Press, Boulder, Colorado, 1985, pp. 25-49. 
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Unlike Chad, the Sudan had been exposed to Turco-Egyptian colonial rule (1820-
1885) before British colonization. Mohammed Ali Basha-the governor of Egypt on behalf 
of the British and Turkish Empires- invaded the Sudan, mainly for economic interests, 
and established a colonial military rule until the death of General Gordon, the general-
governor, and the fall of Khartoum in 1885 to Al-Mahdia rebels.68 
In 1881, Mohammed Ahmad Al-Mahdi, the leader of the Mahdist Movement 
began his 'jihad' or the holy war against colonial rule to establish the Islamic state.69 
Within only four years, he won the war and spread his authority all over the territories of 
the Sudan at that time. His "Khalifamo al-Taashi, continued governing the Sudan under 
Islamic law until they were crushed by the British in the "Karari" battle of 1898. 
In distinction with the French colonial experience in Chad, British authorities had 
the incident of the horrible death of Gordon (and cutting off his head for Al-Mahdi) by 
the 'Drawishm in mind, forcing their compromise with religious groups. They did not 
want to repeat that experience. Thus, they won religious groups over such as the Ansar 
and the Khatmiyya and persuaded them to form political organizations: the Umma Party 
and the Democratic Union Party, respectively. In fact, this was the beginning of the use of 
religion for political purposes in the Sudan, a development the French did not allow to 
occur in Chad. These two political parties have alternated (or jointly) governed the Sudan 
during all its democratic periods. 'Modem Forces' or the intellectuals called them the 
"traditional" parties, the "automatic majority" parties, and the "sign" parties. 72 
B. CHAD AND THE SUDAN UNDER COLONIAL RULE 
Four aspects of the French and British colonial experiences have had a negative 
impact on post-colonial civil-military relations in Chad and the Sudan. These are the 
68Holt, P.M. A Modem History of the Sudan from the Funj Sultanate to the Present Day, Grove Press, 
New York, 1961, p. 86. 
69 1bid, pp. 77-78. 
70 
"Khalifa" is an Arabic word means predecessor. For instance, the rulers of the Islamic State who came 
after the Prophet Mohammed were called his Khalifa ofKhalifs. 
71 
"Drawish" in term given to the "Ansar" or the religious followers of Mohammed Ahmad Al-Mahdi. 
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colonial administration, legal system, education and missionary policies, and ethnicity 
policies. 
· 1. The Colonial Administration 
a. Chad 
The colonial administration in Chad had two main characteristics that 
impacted post-colonial civil-military relations: 1) it was mainly military rule; and 2) it 
created and exacerbated economic, cultural, and political differences between the two 
parts of the country. 
First, the Chadian political culture until today assumes that military 
officers are more capable than civilians in governing the country. 73 I think, this political 
culture is highly influenced by the colonial administration. Chad was administered as a 
part of French Equatorial Africa (which also included Ubangi-Chari, Moyen-Congo, and 
Gabon).74 The governor-general stationed in Brazzaville was the commander-in-chief of 
the French colonial military in this part of Africa. Each of the four colonies was presided 
over by a Lieutenant governor (who was also a military officer). District officers were 
appointed as prefects of the intra-colony regions to help the lieutenant governor. 
An illustration of the legacy of these administrative arrangements can be 
seen in the fact that until the late 1960s, the Chadian civilian prefects dressed in military 
uniforms like the former colonial district officers in official ceremonies. Although local 
traditional chiefs (Sultans and Canton Chiefs) assisted the district officers in some 
administrative aspects, their authority was very limited. That is, civilians were always 
subordinate to military officers; a civil-military relation problem we are facing until' 
today. 
72 
"Sign" is an indication that the supporters of these two parties just move or vote by a sign from their 
religious leaders, without even referring to the electoral program of the party. This is a kind of blind 
obedience. 
73 For instance, in the first democratic presidential multi-party elections of Chad in March 1996, only two 
of the fifteen candidates were former military officers, General Idriss Deby and General Wadal Camoque. 
Yet, they were ranked the first and the second in the results. 
74 
'Ubangi-Chari' is the present central African Republic and 'Moyen-Congo' in the present Congo 
Brazzaville. 
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Second, in Chad, France managed to govern effectively only in the South, 
but failed in the North. The southern blacks, having been freed by the French from the 
"chronic depletion of their human and material resources by Arab and Toubou raiders 
from the north,m5 accepted French rule and welcomed the economic, political, and 
educational innovations introduced by the colonial authorities. 
Thus, in the South, France instituted a regime similar to that in other parts 
of French black-Africa: a centralized hierarchy of district officers presiding over canton 
and village chiefs, all of whom were ultimately responsible to the Paris government by 
way of the territorial governor and his superior (the governor-general of French 
Equatorial Africa). Soon the pagan Sara tribesmen (the biggest ethnic group in southern 
Chad) used the schooling provided first by the state and then by the Christian 
missionaries to enter the lowest levels of administration, then the political arena, and 
finally the national government. 
In the North, the Muslim Toubou and Arab nomads successfully resisted 
French attempts to impose secular institutions, a centralized administration, and a culture 
alien to them. As a result, France was forced to institute a military regime as the most 
effective and economical form of administration for the North. 
Consequently, the southerners benefited from colonial education, political 
experience, and economic investments, whereas the northerners remained resistant to all 
modernization attempts. 
After independence, the political leaders, the armed-forces, and the post-
colonial administration that replaced the colonial state were mainly composed of 
southerners. This, in fact, was the main cause for the civil war and general instability of 
the Chadian political system. However, one of the positive effects of this dual 
administrative policy is that it provided a reasonable balance between the northern part of 
the country, which had already been relatively developed previous to colonial rule, and its 
southern part, which was developed only under colonial rule. 
75Thompson, Virginia and Richard Adloff. Conflict in Chad, University of California Press, Berkeley, 
1981, p. 6. 
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b. TheSudan 
Similar to the French experience in Chad, the British administration in the 
Sudan was militaristic and divisive. However, the policy of indirect rule added a 
distinctive element to the British legacies particularly in terms of class structure and its 
consequences. 
Lord Kitchener became the first governor-general after he had conquered 
the Sudan in 1889. He was responsible for the two condominia until 1910.76 The 
governor-general was not the only military official, but the whole colonial rule was 
completely controlled by the military. Mandour El Mahdi, a history professor in the 
University ofKhartoum, wrote: 
Kitchener appointed a senior British officer in the Egyptian army as 
governor of each province. The governor enjoyed wide powers in the 
internal administration of his province with as little interference as 
possible from the central government. He was assisted by two officers, 
each holding the post of Inspector, later called district commissioner, to 
supervise the districts of the province which were administered by 
Mamurs and sub Mamurs recruited from the officers of the Egyptian 
army.n 
In fact, similar to the case of Chad, British colonial rule in the Sudan was 
not only authoritarian, but also militaristic. This particular administration, which lasted 
for five decades shaped the entire political culture of the Sudanese people. In the post-
colonial era, democracy was not only a new model for them, but also a strange one. This 
. argument will be better illustrated through the performance of civilian regimes and their 
fates by military interventions( as will be demonstrated in this thesis). 
In direct contrast to the French in Chad, the British in the Sudan developed 
only the North and ignored the South. However, the result was the same: a severe 
cultural, religious, intellectual, and economic dualism in the two sections of the colony. 
Under the 'secret' treaty of the closed districts (1930),78 southern Sudan was completely 
isolated from the rest of the Sudan. Christian missions were restricted to the south and 
76 Mandour El Mahdi. A Short Histozy of the Sudan, Oxford University Press, London, 1965, p.l22. 
77 Ibid, p. 124. 
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used only as educational centers, while being outlawed in the north, which enjoyed a 
modem educational system, in addition to Islamic religious schools 'Khalwa. ' 79 This 
created enonnous cultural, educational, and social differences between the two parts of 
the country. Consequently, this policy contributed to the civil war that is going on to this 
day. 
The Sudanese traditional tribal chiefs in the North (called Sheikhs) 
assisted local authorities. Of course, as I have mentioned before, the South was almost 
completely ignored. That is, the British district commissioners allocated some of their 
powers to the chiefs, such as tax collection, law and order, and minor administrative 
services to local inhabitants. This policy was called 'indirect rule.' In fact, the British 
offered more power and respect to the chiefs than they had before. For instance, the 
Mahdi and the Mirganni families added a political dimension to their religious sphere of 
influence after the colonial authorities made these two religious groups the main political 
parties. The parties of the two families have alternated or jointly governed the Sudan in 
its entire democratic period sirice its independence. The majority of the Sudanese, and 
even some intellectuals, were often sympathetic to military coups as a solution to the 
tyranny ofthese two traditional parties. 
2. The Legal System 
Although the British legal system in the Sudan was relatively more developed 
than the French system in Chad, both systems gave judicial power to the governor-
general and his agents in addition to his executive power. In the same manner, top 
African leaders after independence have influenced the judicial systems by their continual 
interventions. Although the leaders of Chad and the Sudan themselves are the ones to be 
blamed for the these unfavorable interventions, we have to acknowledge that the colonial 
rule has provided them with this political culture. These interventions negatively affected 
the distribution of justice and increased corruption in post-colonial Chad and the Sudan. 




The legal system evolved in a slow and halting manner. When the 
federation of French Africa was created in 1910, two categories of justice were 
established. The Africans were to be subject to customary courts or would be judged by 
district courts according to local custom. The Europeans, for the most part, were to be 
tried before French magistrates under the codes of France. The French authorities served 
as a backstop, providing order and mitigating the severity of certain customary sections. 
That is, the role of the French authorities concerning judicial problems of the Chadian 
citizens was only to supervise the traditional customary legal process of the local chiefs. 
There were, however, "no guarantees of personal rights."80 Moreover, "assured separation 
of judicial and executive powers often existed in name only."81 The reliance on local 
customs, which varied widely throughout the region, blocked the development of national 
legal codes. 
b. TheSudan 
In the Sudan, before the formulation of civil and criminal law in 1910, the 
governors and the 'Mamurs' were left to rule the country at their own discretion and with 
the guidance of circulars drawn up by Kitchener. Even when criminal laws were 
promulgated on the basis oflndian law, it was framed in a simple way so that it could be 
understood by the military officers responsible for its application.82 Appeals were to be 
made to the governor-general (who was also the commander-in-chief of the army). In 
other words, the governor-general had the legislative, the executive, and the judicial 
authority at the same time. Moreover, he was the chief of the army. This was the political 
culture to which the Sudanese were subjected for six decades (1898-1956). A knowledge 
79 
"Khalwa" is an Arabic term given for a small Islamic school, where a specific responsible 'Sheikh' 
teaches children the 'Holy Koran" and the basics of Arabic writing. 
80 Nelson, Area Handbook for Chad, p. 34. 
81 Ibid. 
82 Mandour El Mahdi. A Short History of the Sudan, p. 125. Because India was also a British colony, the 
British colonial authorities in the Sudan applied the same Indian law in Sudan. 
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of this culture will help us better understand the struggle between democratization and 
reversion towards traditional, military, and religious authoritarianism. 
3. Education and Religion 
Both the French and British used Christian missions as means for education and 
civilization, particularly in the southern parts of Chad and the Sudan. Spreading religions 
is not necessarily bad, but for educational purposes, a secular system throughout the 
entire country could have provided a common ground for national unity. Religious 
missions concentrated in places where the beliefs were more primitive and natural, or 
traditional (the South). Their activity in this regard was normal. However, the entire 
involvement of the missionaries in the South and their complete neglect of the North, 
gave a new dimension for the "clash of civilizations" which had already begun to 
develop. 
a. Chad 
As in many other African countries, the nature of colonial education in 
Chad produced two clear outcomes in the post-colonial period: first, the number of 
educated Chadians was too small to shoulder the responsibility of running the country 
after independence. In addition to that, there is no doubt that uneducated people are more 
likely to use violence as a tool to solve their problems than are the educated. 
For instance, between World Wars I and II, fewer than twelve Chadian 
-students were able to take advantage of secondary education, which was only in the 
South. 83 On the other hand, among the northern Muslim peoples, Koranic schools offered 
limited training in written Arabic and the reading of the Koran. Indeed, immediately after 
the World War II, the total enrollment of students between six and eight years of age was 
only 1.4 percent of the population. By the year 1971, Harold Nelson, an area specialist, 
found that "[a]bout 88 percent of all males and 99 percent of all females over fifteen 
years of age could not read, write, or speak French - the official national language. Of the 
literate men, about 4.3 percent could read and write French, and about 7.8 percent could 
83 Nelson, Area Handbook for Chad, p. 87. 
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read and write Arabic."84 These facts contradict the argument that Europeans have 
colonized the third world in order to fight ignorance and spread civilization. 
Moreover, the type of education provided was culturally and religiously 
orien:ted. The establishment in 1920 of a Protestant mission school in the south marked 
the beginning of Western forms of education in Chad. Except for religious instruction in 
which local languages could be used, all schools were required to provide instruction in 
French. Mission schools were permitted to offer secondary education only to students 
planning to enter the clergy. Nelson notes that " ... until after World War II, the majority of 
students were enrolled in schools operated by the various religious missions."85 
I will not discuss whether the French educational policy was good or bad, 
because it depends on one's values. But it certainly did provide a favorable environment 
for the later civil war. It is quite normal that any colonizer tries to spread his culture, 
religion, and values. But the problem here was that this policy was applied in one part of 
the country and with a certain ethnic group, in a way that it threatened another already 
existing culture, religion, and ethnicity, in another part of the country. 
This was coupled with a dualistic type of intellectual administrative and 
economic development, which created a sense of inequality and unfairness. The French 
had the chance to consider these differences in forming the borders of Chad, but they did 
not. The post-colonial administration was· not capable of handling this potentially 
dangerous situation wisely. The unsurprising result was a 30-year civil war after 
independence, which has paved the way for military interventions and shaped all of 
Chad's political dynamics. 
b. TheSudan 
In the Sudan, although it was comparatively better than in Chad, British 
educational policy was responsible for the same two major problems as the French policy 
in Chad: inadequacy and divisiveness. That is, as in Chad, "the education system was 
designed more to provide civil servants and professionals to serve the colonial 
84 Ibid, p. 86. 
41 
administration than to educate the Sudanese." As a result, the adult literacy rate at 
independence in 1956 was only 22.9 percent.86 
During the colonial period, the North suffered from shortages of teachers 
and buildings, but education in the South was even more inadequate. That is because, as 
Helen Metz has noted, education in the South was left largely to the mission schools, 
which were proven to be so poor that "as early as the mid-1930s the government imposed 
provincial education supervisors upon missionaries in return for the government subsidies 
that they sorely needed."87 
The Christian missions were restricted to the South and prohibited from 
the North, where some modem educational institutions coexisted with the Khalwa -
traditional Islamic schools. Secular education could have been used as a tool to dissolve 
or lessen the cultural differences that existed between the different ethnic groups. But, 
under colonial rule, it was the opposite: education was tied to religion and became an 
even more divisive instrument. 
Missions remained the means to education after independence. The 
ejection of all foreign missionaries in February 1964, because of the civil war, further 
diminished educational opportunities for southern Sudanese. Ignorance and backwardness 
in the South became even worse, and hence, the disparity between the relative advantages 
of different minorities and the relative equality between the two regions of the country 
became greater. This fueled the ongoing civil war. 
C. THE DECOLONIZATION PROCESS OF CHAD AND THE SUDAN 
In Chad, by developing the severely backward South, the French left a 
developmentally equal but culturally, ethnically, and spiritually distinct North and South. 
The southerners, whom the northerners historically considered as inferior to them, were 
given political power and complete dominance over the North. This situation shaped most 
of the political developments after independence. The civil war between the southern 
85 .Illlil. 
86 Metz, Sudan: A Country Study, p. 110. 
87 Ibid. 
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government and the northern opposition became the foundation of Chad's political field 
and the main cause for military interventions. 
In the Sudan, by developing the north and ignoring the already backward south, 
the British created a culturally, ethnically, and spiritually distinct minority south and an 
intellectually and economically more developed north. The result was the civil war 
between the northern government and the southern minority. More importantly, and 
distinct from Chad, the colonial authorities have divided the north into two main 
competitive parties (the Umma Party was sympathetic to the British, and the Khatmiya 
Party was sympathetic to the Egyptians). Elite competition of the politically divided and 
externally influenced northern parties was the main cause for Sudan's military coups. 
1. Chad 
In 1940 Chad became internationally prominent when its lieutenant governor, 
Felix Eboue, led the rest ofthe AEF (Afrique Equatoriale Fran9aise) federation in support 
of free France under Charles de Gaulle. In 1946, the French constitution granted Chad 
and other African colonies the right to elect a territorial assembly with limited powers. 
The Assembly, in tum, elected delegates to the French General Council of the AEF. The 
position of the governor general was renamed high commissioner, and each territory 
gained the right to elect representatives to French parliamentary bodies, including the 
National Assembly, the Council of the Republic, and the Assembly of the French 
Union.88 The African peoples became French citizens, and the colonies were designated 
overseas territories of France. But the real focus of authority remained in Paris, and 
French personnel continued to dominate the AEF's administration. Indeed, no formal 
attempt was made to train Chadian Africans for civil service positions before 1955.89 
Two major parties were founded: The Chadian Democratic Union(UDT), which 
was associated with a political party in France (the Assembly of French People) and the 
Chadian Progressive Party (PPT), which represented the Chadian intellectuals. The UDT 
88 Collelo, Chad: A Country Study, p. 14 
89 Ibid. 
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leaders were composed primarily of Muslim and Ouadaian nobility, while the PPT 
leaders were comprised mainly of southerners and African civil servants. 
In the elections of 1952 the UDT won 33 of a total of 45 assembly seats, and 
formed the first national government. In the territorial elections of March 1957 the PPT 
won the majority, while the UDT, which had been renamed the 'Chadian Social Action' 
party, won only nine seats. Accordingly, the first territorial government was headed by 
Gabriel Lisette, a former West Indian with considerable administrative experience and 
one of the leaders of the PPT. 
By the year 1959, which was characterized by political instability, Lissete's 
government had fallen. A new government was formed under Sahoulba Gonchome (from 
the same party), but it fell in less than one month. Another government formed in mid-
March 1959 under Ahmed Koulamalla, leader of the UDT party, but lasted less than two 
weeks. On March 25, 1959, the fourth provisional government was installed. Frant;:ois 
Tombalbye, a labor union leader and strong supporter of the PPT, was named premier, 
under whom independence took place .90 
Chad's political structure at independence was clearly divided into two main 
poles: South and North. That is because parties were formed along the same 
geographical, cultural, and ethnic lines. The co-existence of this division with the other 
legacies I have mentioned, such as the incompetence and divisiveness of educational 
policy, resulted in the civil war which led to continual military interventions and general 
instability. 
2. The Sudan 
In the Sudan, after World War II, two political parties were created. The Umma 
Party was headed by al-Sayyed 'sir' Abedlrhman al-Mahdi, Mahamed Ahmed al-Mahdi 
and the religious leader of the Ansar. The National Unity Party (NUP) was headed by al-
Sayyed Ali al-Mirgani, the spiritual leader of the Khatmiyya, the second biggest religious 
90 Nelson, Area Handbook of Chad, p. 40. 
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group after the Ansar. The British sponsored the Umma Party, while the Egyptians 
sponsored the NUP. National Unity meant unity of the Sudan with Egypt. 
After the agreement on self-determination was finalized on February 12, 1953, 
the general elections for the transitional period took place at the end of 1953. The results 
were as follows: the National Union Party (NUP) received 51 seats out of90 in the House 
and 20 out of 30 in the Senate; the Umma Party received 22 seats out of 90 in the House, 
and two out of 30 in the Senate; the National Party (Southern) received nine seats out of 
90 in the House of Representatives; the Social Republican Party received three seats out 
of90 in the House ofRepresentatives; and the non-party candidates won the rest.91 
The parliament held its first meeting on January 7, 1954, and Al-Azhari, whose 
party, NUP, commanded the majority, was elected Prime Minister. He formed the cabinet 
purely from his party. His decision not to share power with the other forces, which had 
won a considerable number of seats in the elections, resulted in serious consequences. 
First came the riots of the 'Ansar' on March 13, 1954, against Egyptian activism. 
34 people were killed, the ceremonial opening of the parliament was abandoned, and 
General Naguib, the Egyptian official who was supposed to preside over the ceremony, 
flew back to Egypt early next day. The Ansar thought that the Egyptians - who 
historically had strong ties to the Khatmiyya - were responsible for their being left out of 
the government. While the British, their friends, were leaving, the Egyptians were 
involved to support their rivals.92 
Second a military rebellion of the southerners occurred on August 18, 1955, 
protesting discrimination against their region and the continuation of preferences for the . 
North. 
Like the Ansar, the southerners expressed their dissatisfaction at Azhari's slight of 
the region in the first national government. This slight confinned what the southemers 
had suspected. Consociation, or the sharing of power, which had proven its effectiveness 
in culturally and ethnically diverse societies such as India, would have brought better 
results. 
91 Mandour El Mahdi. A Short History of the Sudan, pp. 147-148. 
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Similar to the case of Chad, the events of the Ansar and the South illustrate the 
potentially dangerous situation the colonial rule left upon decolonization. 
92 1bid p. 148. 
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IV. POST -COLONIAL POLITICS 
In this chapter, I will show how and why the civilian regimes were so weak in 
Chad and the Sudan; the direct causes for the military interventions; the impact of the 
colonial experience on the civil wars; and the nature of the post-colonial influence and its 
impact on civil-military relations in both countries. 
Since its independence on August 11, 1960, Chad was governed by a democratic 
parliamentary system for two years, a one-party system for 13 years, and several military 
regimes (1975-1996). During its various civilian and military regimes, moreover, Chad 
witnessed not only a severe civil war for three decades, but also an external war against 
Libya and external military interventions (France, Libya, and the OAU). Now, Chad is a 
democratic country with a constitution adopted by the Chadian people, democratically 
elected executive and legislative officials, and an independent judicial system. 
The Sudan, on the other hand, has systematically alternated between civilian and 
military regimes since its independence on January 1, 1956. It was governed by a civilian 
democratic regime from 1956 to 1958, a military regime from 1958 to 1964, another 
civilian democratic regime from 1964 to 1969, another military regime from 1969 to 
1985, a civil-military transitional government for one year, yet another civilian 
democratic regime from 1986 to 1989, and finally, still another military regime from 
1989 up to today. Unlike Chad, Sudan's civil war began during the transition period 
(before independence), and has not yet ended. 
A. CIVILIAN (DEMOCRATIC) REGIMES OF CHAD AND THE SUDAN 
While the political struggle in Chad began between North and South, in the Sudan 
it began among the northerners themselves. The Umma party sympathized with the 
British, and the NUP sympathized with the Egyptians. 
Even though the regional conflict between northern and southern Sudan existed 
since its independence, it was not the main cause of military interventions. Rather, 
competition among the elites of the two northern parties was the most significant factor in 
this respect. In Chad on the other hand, the opposite was true. There was reasonable 
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consensus among the southern elites, who replaced the French authorities. The main 
factor for civilian regime instability in Chad was the regional problem between the North 
and the South. 
1. Chad 
Chad's civilian periods were more durable than in the Sudan. The French 
presence after independence acted as a stabilizing factor, as far as the Chadian regimes 
cooperated with the French and protected their interests. 
a. The First Civilian Period (1960-1975) 
Chad's independence came on August 11, 1960, under the presidency of 
Francois Tombalbaye, a promising young teacher and a union leader from the south, who 
wrestled the leadership of the PPT Party away from Lisette.93 Tombalbaye purged Lisette 
and declared that Lisette was a non-citizen while the latter was abroad· on an official visit 
and barred him from returning to Chad.94 
Tombalbaye continued his policy of eliminating his political opponents by 
banning all political parties except his ruling party (the PPT) in January 1962, and in 
April he established a presidential form of government. In 1963, serious rioting occurred 
in N'Djamena and Am Timan. Tombalbaye used that as an excuse to declare a state of 
emergency and dissolve the National Assembly.95 Moreover, Tombalbaye created a 
special criminal court. By June 1964, Tombalbaye was in full command of the country, 
and made a general increase in tax rates. This increased popular discontent. However, the . 
critical point was reached when some government officials allegedly forced "citizens in 
rural areas to make payments at three times the official taxation rates."96 
During this time, the northerners were politically and economically 
suppressed by the southern authorities, leading to the civil war which legitimized military 
93 Gabriel Lisette was the first leader ofTambalbaye's Party, the PPT, and "a black colonial administrator 
born in Panama and posted to Chad in 1946." Collelo, Chad: A Country Study, p. 15. 
94 1bid, p.18. 
95 1bid, p.18. 
96 1bid, p. 18. 
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interventions as the only available means for seizing or maintaining political power and 
economic resources. 
Although the personal character of Tombalbaye played an important role 
in the failure of Chad's first post-colonial regime, some of the potential causes of this 
failure were already planted by the French colonial experience. That is, by their double-
standard administration and their emphasizing cultural differences between the north and 
south, the French made Chad's post-colonial struggle for political power and economic 
resources inevitable. 
b. The Second Civilian Period (1996- ?) 
Multi-party democracy was only introduced after the victory of the 
"Movement Patriotiuqe du Salue" (MPS) in December 1990. Despite widespread 
criticisms,97 MPS, under the leadership of General Idriss Deby, was able to arrange a 
Sovereign National Conference (CNS) in N'Djamena from January to April 1993.98 In 
that conference, representatives· of the different regional, intellectual, and political groups 
met to debate about the way the country should be ruled. They elected a prime minister 
and a legislative body of transition. The latter would then write a new constitution, which 
was adopted in a national referendum in Jtme 1995. Accordingly, presidential and 
legislative elections were held in 1996. Even though General Deby has declared 
democracy in his first speech on December 4, 1990, the strong stand of France that any 
French aid would be tied onward to the efforts made toward democracy put a lot of 
pressure to realize Chad's democracy. The same policy and the same transitional steps 
were taken in almost all the other French former colonies in sub-Saharan Africa. 
97 The criticisms were based on several reports of human right abuses by the military, particularly in some 
southern and eastern prefectures of Chad, the brutality of some security agents (political police), and the 
fact that the transitional period was too long. This information is based on the author's personal 
observation of events in Chad, his own country. 
98 The "Conference Nationale Souverign" in Chad was one of several typical conferences in many former 
French colonies such as, Mali, Niger, Benin, Togo, Central African Republic, and the Congo. Amor 
Abdelfattay, "L'emergence democratique dans les pays du tiers-monde: le cas des Etats Africains" in 
Gerard Conac (Dir.), L'Afrique en Transition vers le Pluralisme Politique, Econornica, Paris, 1993, pp.60-
68. 
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In fact, French post-colonial influence and neocolonialism acted in favor 
of civil-military relations, at least at this point. 
2. The Sudan 
In contrast with Chad, Sudan's civilian periods were very short and less stable 
than its military periods. Elite competition for political power through the political and 
ideological parties was the main cause for civilian regime instability. The British did not 
act as a stabilizing factor, because they did not have any more influence in the post-
colonial Sudan as in the case of the French in Chad. Moreover, Sudan's new partner, the 
United States favored support to military regimes, rather than civilian opposition. I think, 
among other reasons, the effect of the Cold War could be a legitimate excuse for that 
policy. For instance, the United States did not support the last military regime which took 
place after the end of the Cold War. 
a. The First Civilian Period (1956-1958) 
Sudanese independence took place under the leadership of al-Azhari, who 
won the elections of the transitional period. Taking into account the negative 
consequences of his first transitional government, and in keeping with the demands of the 
two Seyyeds, Ismaeil al-Azhari reorganized his government, recalling the Khatmiyya 
ministers he had earlier dismissed, and including leading Umma figures (Abdalla Khalil 
and Ibrahim Ahmed). In July 1956, the People's Democratic Party (PDP) split from the 
main Khatmiyya party and defeated Al-Azhari on a vote of no confidence, and formed a 
coalition government with the Umma party headed by Abdalla Khalil. 
When the parliamentary term was complete, the coalition of the two 
parties made some changes in the electoral law to limit the power of Azhari before the 
elections of 1958. According to Peter Woodward: 
These changes included: abolishing the five graduates' constituencies99 
where the NUP had held 3 seats, changing the residential rules which 
99 There were a certain number of the constituencies specified for the graduate voters only, in a 
presumption that it was not fair to give the same one-vote power to the intellectuals and university 
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permitted the enfranchisement of more people of West African origin, 
many of whom were Ansar. They also established mobile electoral units to 
increase the nomad vote, which was overwhelmingly linked to the 
sectarian parties, and altered a number of constituency boundaries to the 
extent of gerrymandering in favor of those same parties. 100 
In the first elections after independence, the coalition received a majority 
of seats (Umma, 63 seats and PDP, 26 seats), while the NUP received 70 seats. The 
Sudan Communist Party (SCP) and the Muslim Brothers finished at the bottom of the list. 
Consequently, the old coalition managed to continue a government under Abdalla Khalil 
as Prime Minister. 
Both Abd al-Rahman al-Mahdi (the leader of the Umma) and Ali al-
Mirgani (the leader of the Khatmiyya) wanted the post of the presidency in the coming 
constitutional assembly. The Umma party leaders were thinking about accepting a major 
US aid package, the new partner that was replacing Great Britain. Meanwhile, the 
Khatmiyya leaders were suspicious of that aid. 101 That is, they thought that the aid 
threatened their partnership with Egypt, which at that time had a close relationship with 
the Soviet Union. 
On the other hand, Azhari, who was isolated from the government, flew to 
Cairo where he met the two Sayyeds, who were already there holding discussions with 
the Egyptians. While the three leaders were there trying to make some deals, the 
possibility of a military coup began to gather steam. The Prime Minister, Abdullah 
Khalil, who was once the highest-ranking officer in the Sudanese Defense forces, had 
good connections with the officers, particularly with Major General Abd al-Wahhab, the 
deputy commander of the army and the Umma party member. 
In the first civilian period in Sudan, we can see that the main problem was 
a lack of national consensus, which led to unstable governments. This was, I think, a 
result of the colonial policy of "divide and conquer" and a continuation of the rivalry 
graduates as the illiterates. By the same logic, the National Electoral Committee specified 28 seats (called 
the graduate constituencies) for university graduates in the 1986 elections. 
100 Woodward, Peter. Sudan 1898-1989: The Unstable State, Loster Crook Academic Publishing, London, 
1990, p. 98. 
101 Ibid, p.99. 
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between the two condominia. In fact, the extreme rivalry between the two externally 
oriented parties, which were themselves inherited from the colonial state, ended up 
causing Khalil, the Umma Prime Minister, to hand over the power as a gift to the military 
by inviting them to stage a military coup. 
b. The Second Civilian Period (1964-1969) 
The transitional government after the October Revolution102 was headed by 
Sirr al-Khatham Khalifa, a head of the Khartoum Technical Institute and ex-deputy 
secretary for education with responsibility for the South. Because Khalifa had worked 
close to the south, people hoped that his experience would enable him to deal with the 
question of the South. His cabinet was formed from 15 members: seven from the 
National Front of Professionals (a representative body for workers, peasants, engineers, 
lawyers, academics, teachers, and students); two from the South; and a representative 
from each party (the Umma, NUP ,PDP, SCP, and the Muslim Brothers). 
The government of Sirr al-Khatham began to diverge. On one hand, the 
Professionals' Front and the 'Modem Forces>~03 wanted 50% of the seats in the coming 
parliament to be allocated on an occupational basis to produce a more progressive body 
than the old pre-Abboud system. They also sought to delay the elections until a settlement 
was reached with the South. 
On the other hand, the old parties (Umma, NUP, and PDP) wanted the 
elections earlier and parliamentary representation to be based on the same geographical 
bases. Finally the old parties won: they began to put pressure on the inexperienced Prime 
Minister, until he capitulated and opened the door for old-style elections in the Spring of 
102 In October 1964, the Student Union of the University of Khartoum organized a seminar about the 
problems of Southern Sudan. Representatives of political parties, labor unions, students, and professionals 
were invited. From that seminar, a National Front of Professionals (NFP) was formed to call for a general 
strike asking for the return of military to their barracks. The demonstrations continued and the strike 
spread, especially after the shooting of a university student to death. The military government was forced 
to hand over power to the (NFP). On the other hand, it was protected from the public call to account for 
the regime's period in office. 
103 
"The Modem Forces" is a Sudanese political term, used for the newly emerged political organizations; 
such as the Sudan Communist Party (SCP), the Muslim Brothers (their party was called the Islamic Charter 
Front), and the student movement. 
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1965, which resulted in the victory of the old parties (Umma, 75 seats; NUP, 44; and 
PDP, 8), with a moderate presence of the SCP (eleven) and the Muslim Brothers (Islamic 
Charter Front), who won five out of the eleven seats specified for the graduates 
constituencies. 104 Mohammed Ahmad Mahjoub of the Umma became Prime Minister, 
while Azhari (NUP) became head of the five-member presidency council. 
In July, 1967, Sadiq al-Mahdi became Prime Minister, after entering the 
parliament through what was called 'by-election.' 105 He split from the group ofMahjoub 
and his uncle the 'Imam' al-Hadi al-Mahdi, who had replaced his father. He formed 
another wing of the Umma party. His status as an Oxford-educated young liberal helped 
him to modernize the Umma party. However, the way Sadiq entered the parliament 
(through a by-election) demonstrates the monopoly of politics within certain families, 
which is also a continuation of the British colonial legacy. That is, the British offered a 
lot of loyalty and respect to the family of al-Mahdi since the colonial period. In fact the 
members of al-Mahdi's family in Khartoum were perceived as the members of the British 
royal family in London. 106 
In the elections of 1968, Azhari united the two parties of the Khatmiyya 
(NUP and PDP) and won 101 seats to return to the old alliance with the Imam's wing of 
the Umma, while Sadiq sat on the seats of the opposition. The problem of a permanent 
constitution was on the parliament's agenda,-and debates around Islamic law were very 
intense at the time, especially between the SCP and the Islamic Charter Front. Within 
this environment, the 'Revolution' of May 1969 took place, which brought Numayri into 
power. The Communist Party was the master mind of the coup. 
In addition to their ideological stand for military coups as legitimate· 
means for revolution, the communists had two main concerns that urged the May coup. 
First, they wanted to stop Islamic law which was being discussed in the parliament within 
104 Woodward, Sudan: The Unstable State, p.lll. 
105 When the elections took place, Sadiq was not yet 30 years old, the minimum age for a candidate. As 
soon as he was 30, a member of his party resigned for him to enter the parliament in a "by-election." 
106 The status of the two families (al-Mahdi and al-Mirgani), was one of the major points of disappointment 
and frustration for the Sudanese intellectuals. This status was also a subject of an acute criticism from the 
Communist Party and some military officers. 
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the project of Sudan's permanent constitution. Second, the two main parties and the 
Islamic Charter Front were plotting to outlaw and dissolve the communist party at that 
time. 107 
The second civilian regime reflected the intra-elite competition among 
politicians of the two main parties. This competition was the main cause for the 
weakness of their political system. Unlike Chad, there was a continuous growth of 
ideological groups, such as the Muslim Brothers and the SCP. 
While the French policy of acting as a cultural and political mentor 
protected Chad from ideological diversity, the complete British withdrawal from the 
Sudan paved the way for new ideological parties. These ideological groups, in tum, 
became the key actors in Sudanese politics enhancing the intensity of political 
competition. 
c. The Third Civilian Period (1985-1989) 
After the April Revolution that ended the second period of military rule, 
political parties were formed again and the general elections took place in spring of 1985. 
The Umma party of the Ansar won a total of 99 seats. The NUP of the Khatmiyya won a 
total of 63 seats; the Islamic Front of the Muslim brothers won 37 seats; the alliance of 
the Southern parties won fewer · than that, and the independents, even fewer. The 
communist party (SCP) won only three seats. 
The issue of Islamic law was the main focus of the electoral program. For 
instance, in looking at the most successful parties in the elections: the tJmma's program 
was called "al-Sahwa al-Islamia" which means "the modem Islam"; the NUP's program 
was "al-geomhouria al-Islamia" which means "the Islamic republic"; and the Islamic 
Front had "al-Sharia Islamia" which means "the Islamic law". 
Sadiq al-Mahdi became the Prime Minister, and Ahmed al-Mirgani, the 
head of the state. Sadiq formed his cabinet from Umma, NUP, and the Southerners. 
107 That was because in a party rally, one of the communist leaders made some comments about the 
personality of the Prophet Mohammed that were perceived as disrespectful comments and a lot of Muslims 
were offended. Public demonstrations took place and the problem was raised in the parliament. 
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Sadiq's government was. characterized by inconsistency in the cabinet, and highly 
influenced by the strong opposition of the Islamic Front. 
In late 1988, disagreements in the cabinet caused the coalition to collapse. 
This opened the door for the Islamic Front to share power with the Umma party. In the 
new government, Hassan al-Turabi, the leader of the Islamic Front, became the minister 
of foreign affairs. During this period, the discussion of Islamic law found its way to the 
parliament and the first draft was approved. The NUP led the opposition. 
The NUP, from the seat of political opposition, could make connections with the 
rebellions of the Sudanese People's Liberation Army (SPLA), the main military 
opposition group in the south. The leader of the NUP, Seyyed Mohammed Osman al-
Mirgani, signed a peace agreement with Colonel John Garang, the leader of the SPLA, in 
the city of Kocadam, Ethiopia. Small parties, some scholars, and some professionals 
were invited to witness the event, where suspension of Islamic law was on top of the 
agenda. 
All the secular parties, led by the communist party, put pressure on Sadiq 
al-Mahdi, the Prime Minister, to accept the peace agreement of Kocadam. Finally, Sadiq 
adopted the agreement as a project of the government. Consequently, the final draft of 
the proposal of Islamic law was rejected by the same parliament which passed the first 
draft, and the Islamic front was excluded from the government. 108 As a result, I think, the 
impetus behind the third military coup by the Islamic Front was to secure Islamic law 
from rejection. 
In the second civilian period there are three points to note. First, the 
weakness and instability of the civilian governments continued. Second, the role of 
civilians in Sudan's military intervention was significant; indeed, as we have seen, all the 
civilian periods of the Sudan were ended first by conspiracies between civilians and the 
ideologically oriented elite before they were ended by the military institutions. And third, 
unlike Chad, the question of Islamic law was a fundamental issue for the majority of the 
108 The author witnessed all the events of the second civilian period, while studying pharmacy at the 
University ofKhartoum. 
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Sudanese (for a party to win an election it had to express this as a top priority issue as 
mentioned before). 
I think this latter issue certainly had a lot to do with history of the Sudan, 
and the way the British colonial rule had compromised with the religious groups. The 
French never allowed the politicization of religion in Chad, while the British formed the 
main political parties of the Sudan on religious bases. 
B. MILITARY INTERVENTIONS IN CHAD AND THE SUDAN 
The nature and type of military intervention in Chad and the Sudan differed 
according to the type and the significance of colonial legacy that each of the two 
countries had. In Chad, military interventions were caused by the civil war between the 
north and south, rather than civilian elites' political and ideological competition. In 
contrast, the Sudanese military coups were products of political parties and ideological 
competitions among the northern civilians themselves. Although Sudan had a civil war 
between the north and the south, it did not influence military interventions directly. 
1. Chad 
All Chad's internal and external military interventions were highly influenced by 
its civil war. 
a. Malloum 's Coup 
In 1975, President Tombalbaye was killed in a military coup by certain 
southern military officers who thought that he had given too much to the northerners· 
during his political reform. Afterward, the civil war became even more severe. In 1978, 
General Filix Malloum, the president of the new military council, stmck an agreement 
with some factions and appointed their leader - Habre - as Prime Minister. Hostilities 
continued, however, and the Prime Minister kept his revolutionary army separate from 
the national army. Also, Libya backed another faction, led by Goukouni, in order to 
pursue her own interests. 
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b. Habre's Coup 
In 1979, Habre staged a coup, using his position as prime minister and his 
separate army. Malloum was sent into retirement (under French protection), and the 
remains of his military regrouped in the south under Colonel Kamougue and proceeded to 
massacre more than 10,000 northerners living in the south. 109 
Ten days after the coup, Goukouni entered the capital, N'Djamena, with 
Libyan assistance, and started fighting against the forces of Habre. Between March 10 
and August 21, four conferences took place in Nigeria in the hope of finding a framework 
acceptable to the warring factions. 110 Habre was forced to flee N'Djamena to eastern 
Sudan, rearrange his forces, and re-enter N'Djamena in 1982. Then he continued 
governing Chad by military rule until December 1990. 
c. ldriss and Djamous Movement 
In April 1988, Colonel Idriss Deby (the military advisor to President 
Habre and a former general chief of staff) and Hassan Djamous (the general chief of staff 
at that time) fled to the Sudan after being accused of plotting a coup. Djamous was killed 
in combat with government troops. However, Idriss survived, and he was able to form an 
alliance of different opposition groups, and defeated Habre by December 1990.lll Idriss 
Debey declared that his objective was to bring about democracy and freedom, and he 
fulfilled his promise after a transitional period of five years. 
d. External Interventions (France, Libya, and the OAU) 
In addition to the ongoing civil war during the 1980's, Chad witnessed 
French and Libyan intervention and an OAU peacekeeping operation. 
109 Collelo, Chad: A Country Study, p. 28. 
110 Ibid, p. 28. 
111 In his first speech to the Chadians on December 4, 1990, Idriss Deby said: "Chadian people, what do 
you think I have brought to you as a gift? I brought you neither gold nor silver; I brought you even a more 
valuable thing; freedom and democracy." "Ni or ni argent, liberte et democracie," means neither gold nor 
silver, liberty and democracy. 
57 
The Chado-Libyan war around the Aozou Strip and the Libyan 
intervention which began in 1973 was a direct product of the French colonial legacy of 
territorial disputes. Thomas Collelo, in his book about Chad rioted: 
An event occurred in 1935 that was to have far-reaching consequences 
throughout the 1970s and 1980s. In that year, the French colonial 
administration negotiated a border adjustment with Italy, Libya's colonial 
master. The adjustment would have relocated the Libyan-Chad boundary 
about 100 kilometers south across the Aozou Strip. Although the French 
legislature never ratified the agreement, the negotiations formed part of the 
base of Libya's claim to the area decades later. 112 
However, France intervened in Chad in 1979 to help the Chadian government to face the 
Libyan threat. 113 
The OAU intervened in Chad by the Lagos Accord of August 21, 1979, in 
which a national unity government(GUNT) was formed from eleven different Chadian 
factions at war with each other under the presidency of Goukouni, vice president of 
Kamouque, and Habre, the defense minister. One result of this was that the Inter-African 
Peacekeeping Force (IAF) was formed from 600 Congolese troops. 
Accordingly, the Libyan troops were asked to withdraw by October 1981, 
and an additional 4,800 IAF troops were formed from Nigeria, Senegal, and Zaire and 
deployed in Chad in December 1981. GUNT (Gouvemement d'Union Nationale de 
Tchad) failed, and the troops of Habre entered the capital N'Djamena on June 7, 1982 
with the assistance of the United States and her allies at that time, such as Sudan and 
Egypt, while the OAU troops showed no resistance. 114 
Unlike in the case of Sudan, as we will see, all the military interventions in 
Chad were directed against either a military or authoritarian regime or, more often, both. 
112 Collello, Chad: A Country Study, pp. 13-14. 
113 Thompson and Adloffreported that there was "a secret deal allegedly made early in 1987 by France and 
Libya, whereby Chad was to be divided into two zones of influence. The northern zone would in effect 
become a part of Libya, whereas France would be given a free hand in Chad's five southern prefectures." 
Virginia Thompson and Richard Adoff. Conflict in Chad, p. 140. Also Sennen Andriamirado reported irl 
the journal of Jeune Afrique, December 24, 1980 that Khadafi said to Giscard d'Estaing: "Leave me my 
Muslims and I will leave you your blacks." ThiQ. 
114 Collelo, Chad: A Country Study, pp. 27-30. 
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Also, all these interventions were products of the civil war, in which French colonial 
policy played a major role, and the consequences of that war. 
2. The Sudan 
The Sudan had a military coup bringing an end to each civilian period. The three 
main military coups that occurred in the Sudan were direct results of political and 
ideological parties, as we will see one after another. 
a. Aboud's Coup 
Only a few hours before the constituent assembly was due to reconvene on 
November 17, 1958, General Abboud, the army commander, and his fellow officers took 
power. " ... with at least the connivance if not the encouragement of the old soldier [the 
prime minister] from whom they took over".ll5 Nobody complained because it was a 
voluntary hand-over of power as Muddathir Abd al-Rahim and Peter Woodward reported: 
It was essentially a hand-over to the military by the civilian Prime 
minister, Abdallah Khalil (himself a former senior army officer) in 
circumstances in which the leaders of his party, the Umma Party, and 
senior military personnel were convinced that the divisions amongst the 
political parties, within the context of the international politics were too 
heavy to bear. 116 · 
'\ 
Abboud announced that they would shortly hand the power back to 
civilians, but after they had enjoyed the taste of power, and seen economic progress, they 
decided to hold on to power. A new presidential system was established with emergency 
powers vested in Abboud and the supreme council composed of twelve, which was later 
reduced to six. 
Two of them (Brigadiers Abd al-Rahim Shannan and Muhy al-din 
Abdallah) were barred from the council because of alleged pro-Umma character. The two 
Brigadiers made two unsuccessful attempts at taking over the power from Aboud and 
115 Muddathir Abd Al-Rahim, Raphael Badal, Adnan Hardallo, and Peter Woodward. Sudan Since 
Independence, Grower Publishing Company, England and USA, 1986. p. 100. 
116 Ibid, p. 66. 
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ended up in jail. Another coup attempt was made by Colonel Ali Hammed, who was tried 
and hanged with four of his fellow plotters. 
Only four figures from the military supreme council remained in control of 
the country. There were no significant efforts to militarize the regime or to politicize the 
army. However, the regime introduced some administrative rearrangements, which, along 
with a mixture of elected and nominated memberships, was composed of a hierarchy of 
councils, starting from local and regional, all the way up to central government. All the 
provincial governors were military officers. 
The opponents of the Umma party in particular, and even some members 
of the Umma party, called for the return of the military to their barracks when they felt 
that the military had settled in the government. Some of the active political leaders were 
jailed for several months by the military government. The 'Modem Forces' lead by the 
Sudan Communist Party, student unions, and labor forces (particularly the Sudan railway 
union) all began to tum against the military regime. All these forces· participated in the 
October Revolution that ended the first military regime in 1964. 
Unlike military interventions in Chad, the occurrence and the end of the 
first Sudanese military regime was not directly related to the civil war. Rather, it was a 
product of competition among elites, and ideological group activism. 
b. Numayri's Coup 
On May 25, 1969, the 'Free Officers', 117 led by Jaafar Mohammed 
Numayri, overthrew the weak civilian government, and claimed that their revolution was . 
in the tradition of the October Revolution of 1964. They claimed that they had played a 
significant part in ensuring the success of the October uprising. Feeling that the old 
traditional parties had begun to lose the flavor of October revolution, the masses and 'the 
Modem Forces' supported the new regime. The communist party (SCP) possessed among 
its ranks three of the seven members of the Revolution Command Council. 
117 The 'Free Officers' was a political organization within the officer corps, thought to be initiated by the 
Communist Party. 
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Although the SCP was behind the May coup and Numayri was very 
sympathetic towards the communists, the Nasserist dimension of Numayri and the 
prospects of the newly proposed union with Egypt and Libya made the SCP suspicious of 
Numayri. Moreover, Numayri removed the three communist officers from the 
Revolution Command Council. The best solution that the SCP saw at that point was to 
depose the leader. Subsequently, SCP attempted a coup, led by Majors Hashim al-Atta, 
Faroug Hamadallah, and Babiker al-Nour, the former members of the Revolution 
Command Council who Numayri removed. The coup survived for three days. During this 
time they managed to gain control of the capital Khartoum and put Numayri and other 
officers in prison. Shortly afterwards, however, Numayri escaped and led a successful 
counter-coup, with the aid of Egypt and Libya. Numayri executed the coup leaders and 
outlawed the communist party. 
Numayri applied a one-party system (copied from the Egyptian experience 
of Nasser) under the Sudan Socialist Union (SSU), which based Sudanese political life 
around the "alliance of the working forces . of the people as represented by farmers, 
workers, intellectuals, national capitalists, and soldiers."118 The new political system also 
included 'functional organizations' in various professional fields including the army, 
women's unions, youth unions, students, etc. Moreover, Numayri created the People's 
Assembly (whose candidates were nominated by the SSU), and he institutionalized all 
this in a permanent constitution, adopted by the aid of the People's Assembly in 1973. 
Pressed by the Muslim Brothers, led by Hassan al-Turabi, with whom 
Numayri shared power after reconciliation, Numayri declared the Sharia (Islamic) laws in 
September 1983.119 This was strongly opposed by secular forces, Southerners, and his 
partners in the West, especially the United States, upon whom Numayri depended 
heavily. 
118 Muddathir Abd Al-Rahim, et. al. Sudan Since Independence, p. 68. 
1191b·d 4. . 
_l_.p .. 
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c. Sowar al-Dahab 's Coup 
Similar to Aboud's regime, Numayri's regime was ended by a popular 
revolution (the April Revolution) on April 6, 1985. Prior to his visit to the West 
(including the United States) to find a solution to his economic and political problems, 
Numayri declared increases in the price of bread and other essential goods. The public, 
including all segments of the society, immediately protested on the streets, leading to a 
general strike and riots. The situation was so severe that the security forces were 
overwhelmed and could do nothing. Finally, the general chief-of-staff of the military 
(General Abd al-Rahman Sowar al-Dahab) announced a change of regime on behalf of 
the civilians. He promised to give the pmver back to civilians within a limited period of 
time. 
Sowar al-Dahab appointed a military council of 15 members responsible 
for constitutional matters and a civilian government, headed by Dr. Algazouly, 
responsible for all executive concerns. The agenda of this government was to start 
preparations for the elections, peace talks with the rebellions, and routine matters of the 
government. Although peace negotiations failed, they did prepare for the elections and 
held them on schedule (after exactly one year). On April 26, 1986, Sowar al-Dahab gave 
power to the elected parliament and stepped out. 
d. Al-Bashir's Coup 
Only a few days before the date on which the Sadiq-Garang meeting was 
scheduled, General Omar al-Beshier staged a third military coup on June 30, 1989. The 
coup leaders hid their identity at first. They declared that they were following the way of 
Nasser, and that they did not belong to any political group or party. Accordingly, the 
Egyptian government acknowledged them officially and many other countries followed. 
After a while, it became clear that they were the secret military wing of the Muslim 
Brothers and their sympathizers. Eighteen months later, the regime declared the Islamic 
law as a way of life and began the application of general reforms in all domains of life in 
order to be consistent with Islamic law. 
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In October 1990, all the other parties, including the old - Umma and NUP 
- and the new secular parties, united to form a political opposition named the National 
Democratic Alliance(NDA). The SPLAjoined NDA. 
This is the third time, out of the three coups in the Sudan, in which the 
military intervention was catalyzed by civilian conspiracy or with strong civilian support, 
especially of the ideological groups. 
C. CIVIL WARS OF CHAD AND THE SUDAN 
The Chadian civil war was, principally, the major source of Chad's political 
instability and military interventions. That is, the war was so severe because of the 
relative balance in the power of the two warring sides. In contrast, Sudan's civil war has 
been an imbalanced war between the northern majority, which monopolizes almost all 
political power and economic resources, and the southern minority, which has been 
marginalized. That is why, unlike Chad, Sudan's civil war did not have a significant 
effect on political stability. As stated before of course, both civil wars were seeded by the 
French and the British colonial legacies. That is why despite similarities in the nature and 
the causes of the two wars, their outcomes differed according to the colonial policies, the 
independent variable. 
1. Chad's Civil War 
The first and the most significant armed opposition group in Chad after its 
independence in 1960, was the Front for the National Liberation of Chad (Front de 
Liberation Nationale du Tchad- FROLINAT). It was initially formed in exile in 1962. 
On November 1, 1965, frustration with what was perceived as government 
mismanagement and tax-collection abuse erupted in riots in the town of Mangalme in 
Guera Prefecture. Five hundred people died, including the local deputy to the National 
Assembly and nine other government officials. 
In June 1966, FROLINAT was reinvigorated in Nyala in southwestern Sudan 
under the leadership of Ibrahim Abatcha. From Mangalme and nearby Batha Prefecture, 
the rebellion spread to Ouaddai and Salamat Prefectures, where in February 1967 the 
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prefect and deputy prefect were killed. 120 Abatcha died in combat in February 1968 and 
Abba Siddick became FROLINAT's new secretary general after a couple of years. 
FROLINAT was principally a northern and Muslim movement, directed against 
the French-supported southern non-Muslim regime of Tombalbaye. Arab countries such 
as the Sudan, Algeria, and Libya had supported FROLINAT for that reason. Moreover, 
some ofthe same ethnic groups lived in Chad, Sudan, and Libya. 
On the other hand, the government in N'Djamena, which was led by the 
Christian-dominated southerners, depended highly on its traditional partner - France. 
Indeed, the historical background of the. colonial administration, as I have already 
mentioned, influenced much of Chad's post-independence politics. Thus France had little 
chance to gain the confidence of the northerners. This also explains the reliance of 
President Goukouni on Libya; President Habre121 on the United States; and President 
Tombalbaye and Malloum, who were from the south, on France. In fact, after the 
formation of the (FROLINAT), all the northern factions had either relied on Libya or the 
United States and its African allies (i.e., Sudan, Egypt, and Zaire). Meanwhile, France 
remained somewhere between backing the weakened Southerners' government and 
dealing with the Northerners' effective opposition. 
Between 1969 and late 1971, President Tombalbaye had taken a variety of steps to 
alter the relations that had existed between the central government and the North since 
independence. Following Tombalbaye's presidential elections of 1969, important 
northern opposition leaders were allowed to enter high government positions, and some 
600 political prisoners were released. 122 
In April 1971, Tombalbaye, addressing the Seventh Congress of the PPT, 
" ... admitted for the first time that he had made mistakes and that there were some 
shortcomings associated with his policies."123 Moreover, in June 1971, Tombalbaye freed 
another 1,500 political prisoners and toured rebel regions in the north, where he 
12
° Collelo, Chad: A Country Study, p. 20. 
121Presidents Goukouni and Hahn:~ were from Northern Chad. 
122 Nelson, Area Handbook for Chad, p. 127. 
123 Collelo, Chad: A Country Study, p. 21. 
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promised, among other things, government-subsidized sugar and salt for the nomads of 
Zouar and Bardai. 124 These nomads " ... had never recognized any form of authority; even 
their chiefs had only religious significance."125 Despite these major changes, the war 
continued. The huge cultural, ethnic, and religious gap between the two regions coupled 
with a lack of confidence in each other remained as difficult barriers to the achievement 
of national unity. 
As we saw in the section on military interventions, the civil war became the cause 
of all military interventions and political unrest of Chad throughout the regimes of 
Malloum, Goukouni, and Habre. In fact, the Chadian civil war continued until 1993, 
when a sovereign national conference accepted democracy as the only solution to Chad's 
problems. 
2. Sudan's Civil War 
In the Sudan, the colonial legacy of the "closed district policy"126 was the time 
bomb that exploded even before the complete departure of the colonizer. That is, on 
August 18, 1955, units of the Equatorial Corps fi·om the South mutinied at Torit, 
ransacking the military stores. The Equatorial province and parts of Bahr-el-ghazal were 
subjected to massacres and lawlessness by both soldiers and civilians. Hundreds of 
northern civilians living in that area were killed. 
In fact, the stage for the trouble was being set during the years of the colonial rule. 
"The policy of segregation exercised under the condominium created an image which 
pictured the northerner in the south as a slave-dealer and a swindler."·127 This was coupled 
with a feeling of lmfair economic, political, and intellectual treatment from the northern 
politicians. 
124 Ibid, p. 21. 
125 Nelson, Area Handbook for Chad, p. 127. 
126 
"The Closed Districts' Treaty" was a secret treaty made in 1930. It mandated the isolation of the 
southern Sudan from the rest of the country. Accordingly no entry of northern Sudanese to the north (or the 
vice versa) was allowed. Christian missions were allowed to work only in the south and restricted from the 
north. Woodward. Sudan 1898-1989: The Unstable State, p. ix. 
127 Abd Al-Rahirn, Sudan Since Independence, p. 69. 
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During President Aboud's regime (1958-1964), the southerners formed what was 
called the Sudan African Closed Districts National Union (SACDNU) in 1962. They 
began seeking support in Europe and North America, especially among Christian 
organizations. Also, guerrilla groups in the region became active, especially after the 
nationalization of the mission schools, the Arabization program, and the moving of the 
Sabbath from Sunday to Friday. 
During the second military period (1969-1985), President Numayri had the 
opporttmity to put an end (at least temporarily) to the civil war in the South through the 
peace agreement between the Sudanese government and the rebels of the "Ananya" in 
Addis Ababa in 1972. This peace agreement, however, was reversed in 1983. 
In May 1983, President Numayri decided to divide the south into three 
administrative regions, reviving a decades-old conflict. John Garang, a dissident Colonel, 
led a mutiny in garrisons of the south and founded the Sudan People's Liberation Army 
(SPLA). Numayri's declaration of strict Islamic Sharia law across Africa's largest 
country in September 1983, worsened the situation. 
After the end ofNumyari's regime, the transitional government invited Garang to 
participate in the multi-party elections, but he refused. The civilian government of Sadiq 
al-Mahdi (1986-1989) put a lot of effort into ending the war. But the lack of confidence 
in the northern politicians and the deep cultural, religious, and economic differences 
between the two parts of the country forced them to abandon these efforts. 
After the military coup by the Islan1ic fundamentalists on June 30, 1989, the 
situation became even more complex. That is because one of the main demands of the . 
SPLA is to separate between religion and state, while the leaders of the new regime claim 
that their primary goal is to implement Islamic principles in all aspects of life. 
In 1994, peace talks in Nairobi chaired by Kenyan President Daniel Arap Moi, 
head of the mediation committee of the regional Inter-Governmental Authority on 
Development (IGAD), led to a Declaration of Principles providing for a secular state. 
Khartoum denounced the Declaration and launched its largest offensive of the war. 
However, after opening a new front in the eastern Sudan by the NDA in 1997, the 
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government and SPLA agreed to meet face-to-face in Nairobi on October 29, 1997. After 
10 days ofnegotiations, the !GAD-sponsored talks were adjourned without agreement. 
Unlike Chad, the Sudanese civil war is still going on. While the French policy in 
Chad brought about a reasonable regional balance (despite the cultural diversity), the 
British policy in the Sudan widened the gap even further between the two parts of the 
country. Indeed, Chad's civil war was a struggle for political power and economic 
resources, while Sudan's civil war was both a struggle of the southern minorities for their 
identity and a struggle for self-actualization as well. Despite some similarities between 
the conditions and causes of the two civil wars, differences between the two colonial 
experiences and their policies have produced clearly distinct outcomes. This illustrates 
the relevance of the impact of colonial legacy on political instability. 
D. POST-COLONIAL RELATIONS WITH FRANCE AND BRITAIN 
One of the major differences between the French and the British colonial legacies 
in Chad and the Sudan is neocolonialism, or the post-colonial influence. That is, France 
has sustained her special bilateral economic, cultural, and political ties with Chad after 
independence, while Britain has not sustained such relations with the Sudan after its 
independence. 
1. Chad 
As in most of her other former African colonies, France remained the primary 
economic, political, and military partner of Chad. For instance, total Chadian imports 
from France from 1979 to 1985 were 35.1 percent, 12.6 percent, 19.1 percent, 24.6 
percent, 25.8 percent, 43.4 percent, and 48.5 percent, respectively. In 1994, France 
supplied 39.16 percent of Chad's imports. 
Moreover, France still has advisors at all levels of administration in the country. 
There are also two French military bases in the capital N'Djamena. Any major political or 
economic changes in France will be directly reflected in Chad. The devaluation of the 
Franc (CF A) was an example of this phenomenon, and the expected unification of the 
European currencies is likely to be a turning point for Francophone African states. The 
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young Chadian democracy, which has effected economic liberalization by opening 
markets, privatizing state-owned institutions, and encouraging national and foreign 
investment, is highly influenced by French pressure. 
2. The Sudan 
Meanwhile, British decolonization is almost complete. The level of Sudan's 
economic and political relations with Britain remains lower than normal for post-colonial 
states. Instead of Britain, Sudan has found other Western and Eastern partners in addition 
to the Arab states. For instance, the percentage of Sudanese trade with Britain in the years 
1987, 1988, and 1989, was 10.0, 9.3, and 8.3, respectively. 128 Moreover, after the military 
coup of 1989, which was led by the Islamic Fundamentalists, Sudan decided to apply 
Islamic principles in all her economic institutions and policies. 
Thus, Sudan is not only distancing itself from Britain, her former master, but also 
from all Western political and economic philosophies. I think this phenomenon has been 
inadvettently promoted by the British policy of politicizing the religious groups, a policy 
completely opposite to that of the French in Chad. In contrast to the current French 
influence in Chad, Britain has very little, if any ability to affect current Sudanese 
economic and political policies. 
128 Metz, Sudan: A Countty Study, p. 284. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
In this thesis, I have discussed the impact of the colonial legacy on civil-military 
relations in Africa after independence. In part one, I made a general comparative analysis 
of the British and the French legacies. Then, I discussed how these legacies have had a 
hand in shaping the current civil-military relations, political stability, and democratic 
situations of Chad and the Sudan. 
This study has made some explanations why African political and economic 
conditions are so bad. We have seen that colonial rule has shaped a particular African 
authoritarian culture for several decades, which cannot be changed within just a few 
years. Although Africans themselves are responsible for most of Africa's economic and 
political problems, the burden of the colonial legacy and its effect on political economic 
and security options inherited by African leaders is unique and it deserves recognition. 
A. SUMMARY OF THE FINDINGS 
Colonial administration, educational policy, ethnic tensions, and territorial 
~isputes are the important elements of the colonial legacies that contributed to make 
arbitrary rule and military interventions inevitable in. post-colonial Africa. Political 
instability in general and the civil wars in particular provided unfavorable environments 
for good governance and economic development in Africa. The Chadian and the 
Sudanese civil wars and military coups were found likely to be products of those colonial 
legacies. 
The colonial administration and educational policy in both Chad and the Sudan 
increased cultural, linguistic, religious, and economic diversity and inequality between 
the northern and southern parts of the two countries. These colonial legacies created 
differences combined with the historical ethnic and geographical differences to contribute 
to the civil wars of the two countries. 
While Chad's civil war became the direct and major cause for military 
intervention, the externally and ideologically oriented competition among elites in the 
Sudan became the direct and major cause for its military interventions. I have related both 
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cases to the French and British legacies, respectively. This variation in the outcomes, 
despite the similarities of the two cases, illustrates the role of a particular colonial 
experience in shaping civil-military relations. 
Unlike Chad, the effect of class structure on military interventions was significant 
in the Sudan. That is, most of the military coups in Sudan, if not all, were justified and 
enjoyed significant support among different segments of the population, who in turn saw 
the military as a part of their class and as an institution that might protect their interests. 
Laborers, students, and professionals (the second class) were often sympathetic to 
military coups as a way to overcome the tyranny of the two old traditional parties, the 
Umma and the Khatmiyya, who had gained the majority in all elections. The Numayri 
coup was a typical example. As mentioned before, it was supported by most segments of 
the society. 
The French had a policy of excluding religion from politics in Chad. The British, 
on the other hand, compromised with religious groups and helped them to tum into 
political parties in the Sudan. These two distinct policies have produced different 
outcomes: a secular system in Chad and a religious state in the Sudan. In my opinion, this 
explains why the Chadians were able to overcome their civil war, while the Sudanese 
were not. This distinction also illustrates that some colonial legacies brought beneficial 
results. However, the scope of my thesis is not to answer the good or bad question. 
Rather, it is to show the causal linkage that explains some patterns of the military coups 
and political instability. 
One of the major differences between the French and British legacies we have 
seen in this thesis is the strong French post-colonial influence in Chad and the special 
bilateral ties between Chad and France. Unlike British post-colonial relations with the 
Sudan, French political, military and economic relations still have a direct impact on civil 
military relations in Chad. 
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B. IMPLICATIONS 
A deep understanding of the impact of colonial legacy and African political 
culture has important academic and political implications for future research and policy 
options. 
1. Academic and Theoretical Implications 
In my review of the literature on Africa's political and economic problems (in 
general), and its civil military relations (in particular), I found very little, if any, 
consideration of the effect of historical background, colonial experience, and political 
culture by the different scholars that have tried to find explanations for these problems. 
This study can add to the previous efforts done in the area of comparative politics 
focusing on Africa, and it can draw attention the consideration of these concepts in future 
studies. 
Moreover, I think my arguments- (regarding the impact of colonial legacy on civil-
military relations in Africa) could be applicable in other areas. Regions such as Latin 
America and Southeast Asia, which were highly affected by colonialism, and yet have 
had problems in their civil-military relations, are potential areas for research. Thus I 
would recommend that experts in these areas look at the possibility of these claims of the 
effect of colonial legacies. 
2. Political and National implications 
The post cold-war environment has generated a general tendency toward · 
democratization. The United States, which maintains the spread of democracy as one of 
her national security goals, 129 and other Western powers, such as France, have allocated 
resources for democratization efforts and have tied other economic and military 
assistance to this central process. I think it is critically important to identify the structural 
obstacles to democracy accurately and tackle them properly. 
129 The White House. A National Security Strategy for a New Century, May 1997, p. 28. 
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Another implication at the national level is for the African leaders. That is, my 
study does not suggest that it is the. responsibility of the former colonial powers to correct 
the impact of the legacy they left behind. On the contrary, it is important for our leaders 
to know that only Africans themselves can and should overcome these problems. 
However, this study is important for the new generation of African leaders, because it 
may help them further understand some of the major causes behind the failure of their 
predecessors. Moreover, other developed countries (in general) and the former colonial 
powers (in particular) may better understand their moral responsibility to help African 
nations solve these problems (which they have contributed to cause by one way or 
another) and integrate with the rest of the global society and economy. 
C. RECOMMENDATIONS 
Based on the findings and the implications ofthis study, I would recommend that 
scholars who are concerned with African studies consider the possible effect of African 
culture and colonial background (which is also a significant part of the African culture). 
These considerations are important because, without knowing the real cause of a problem, 
one can never prescribe a proper treatment. Any approach to understand the problem or 
suggest a solution without taking these factors into account leads simply to "barking up 
the wrong tree," or is destined to fail. 
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